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INTRODUCTION
This is an analysis of the interrelationship of organization design 
and program integration in field management of the Safeguard Ballistic 
Missile Defense System Program. The analysis is performed by means of 
a study of both the government and industry Safeguard Program field 
management organizations, with particular emphasis on the United States 
Army Safeguard System Command, Huntsville, Alabama, and the Western 
Electric Project Organization, Greensboro, North Carolina.
The analysis is conducted through the use of a simple system model. 
The system model is open in the sense of considering influences from 
certain environments, yet closed in the sense of consideration of all 
possible environmental influences. The system model employs goals, 
planning, control, efficiency and communications as the conceptual 
representations of the system model elements of boundary, input, con­
version, output and feedback.
Field management is used in the context of the implementation phase 
of the traditional policy-implementation paradox. Field management 
relates to those government organizations and activities at the field 
command-specialized agency level and to those industry organizations and 
activities at the project management level.^ Field management is
^These levels will be explained in Chapter II.
concerned with the Influencing, interpretation, implementation 
and monitoring of program decisions evolving from the general 
policy level.
Field management of the Safeguard program is a joint 
responsibility of the government and the Western Electric Company. 
The Safeguard System Command is the "lead" government organization 
while the Western Electric Project Organization is the "lead" 
industry organization for field management.
The interrelationships of organization design and program 
integration in field management of the program are analyzed 
relative to each of the conceptual representations used to portray 
the elements of the system model. The conclusion is the development 
of a theoretical hypothesis of the interrelationship of organization 
design and program integration and the development of operational 
indications that are applicable to both Safeguard program 
peculiarities and to similiar programs and organizations.
Standard terminology is used where possible. When not 
possible, definitions are provided at the point where the non­
standard terminology is first used.
Numerous illustrations are provided for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining the context and perspective of the 
subject being discussed. Use of the illustrations is necessary 
for those not intimately familiar with the Safeguard program 
or its field management.
The opinions, conclusions and interpretations expressed 
herein are the result of independent research and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army 
or the Western Electric Company.
ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND PROGRAM INTEGRATION: A STUDY
OF THE GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY FIELD MANAGEMENT 
OF THE SAFEGUARD PROGRAM
CHAPTER I
THE PROGRAM AND SYSTEM
The importance of the Safeguard program is evident from its impact
1 2 
on international political considerations, strategic defense planning,
and national goal assessments. Its role in the international nuclear
balance and its long-range impact on the national budget makes it
susceptible to inclusion in major economic and political considerations
3
at the national level.
Historical Evolution 
The Safeguard program was not conceived in the months, or even 
years, immediately preceding the 1969 decision to begin deployment of 
the system. It is the result of an evolutionary process in the sphere 
of air defense protection, spanning approximately twenty years. In the
^U. S., Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Report to Congress, 
"Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Program and Budget," February 20, 1970.
2
Herman Kahn, "The Case of a Thin System," Unpublished Report of 
the Hudson Institute, May 27, 1969.
3
U. S., President Richard Nixon, A Report to Congress, "U. S.
Foreign Policy in the 1970's; a New Strategy for Peace," February 20, 1970.
5late-1940’s, the Nike Ajax air defense program was initiated, marking 
the beginning of a continental United States air defense capability by 
means of a surface-to-air missile system. In 1953 the Nike Hercules air 
defense program was Initiated to provide increased capabilities beyond 
that of Nike Ajax. Nike Hercules was a second generation approach to 
the surface-to-air missile defense requirements.
With the development and subsequent deployment of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), a concurrent awareness developed of the need 
for protection of the United States from possible nuclear attack by 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. In response to this need, the 
Nike Zeus program was initiated in the mid-1950's. Nike Zeus utilized 
certain technology and concepts developed in previous ballistic missile 
defense research efforts. In 1963 the Nike Zeus program was reoriented 
to the Nike-X project. The Nike-X project was a continuation of the 
evolutionary process of developing an anti-ballistic missile defense 
capability. In 1967 the decision to begin deployment of an anti-ballistic
4
missile defense system was made. This deployment was given the title 
of Sentinel system. The Sentinel program envisioned a limited degree 
of protection of the United States against a Soviet ballistic missile 
threat. The program was designed to provide both likely enemy attack 
route and area coverage of the United States.
With the change of national administration in January 1969, a com­
prehensive review was made of the 1967 decision to deploy the Sentinel 
system, as well as the current and projected ballistic missile threats and
^U. S., Department of the Army, General Order 48, "U. S. Army 
Sentinel System Organization Established," November 15, 1967.
6the Sentinel system deployment's probable Impact on United States-Soviet 
relations. From this review a decision was made to reorient the Sentinel 
program to the Safeguard program. On March 14, 1969, President Nixon 
announced these decisions.^ ^The Safeguard and Sentinel titles are used 
interchangeable in reference to the system. This is due to the Safeguard 
program being a continuation of the Sentinel program with different 
threat bases, deployment arrangements and equipment configuration.
System Purpose and Description 
The March 1969 decision to begin deployment of the Safeguard system 
outlined a program aligned to fulfill three objectives:^
1. Protection of the United States land-based retaliatory 
forces (Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Strategic Air 
Command manned bombers) against direct attack by the Soviet Union.
2. Defense of the people of the United States against the 
kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to 
mount within the decade.
3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks 
of the United States from any source.
The program concept for Safeguard is one of a limited initial 
deployment (two sites initially authorized), with an annual reassessment 
of the technical Safeguard system developments, the Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile threat to the United States and the international
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents, "Statement by the President Announcing His 
Decision on Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,"
March 14, 1969.
^Ibid.
nuclear arms environment as bases for subsequent incremental deployment
7 8
decisions. Areas near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota and
g
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana were selected as the two initial 
Safeguard system deployment sites. This limited initial deployment was 
approved by Congress in 1969.
The total Safeguard program, as outlined by President Nixon in 
March 1969, ultimately includes twelve sites. The administration proposed 
for Fiscal Year 1971 authorization to deploy one additional site at 
Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, deployment of additional Sprint 
missiles at the two sites already authorized and authorization to begin 
long lead-time activities associated with possible future deployment of 
five additional sites,
The Safeguard system includes five major equipment subsystems, as 
well as a large amount of ancillary and supporting equipment. The major 
equipment subsystems are the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), Missile 
Site Radar (MSR), Spartan interceptor missiles. Spring interceptor 
missiles and large capability data processing centers.
The Perimeter Acquisition Radar performs the function of detecting 
attacking warheads at long range. The radar utilizes a phased array
^Ibid.
g
U. S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 839-69, "Selection of 
Tentative Safeguard Facilities in North Dakota," October 8, 1969.
0
U. S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 892-69, "Selection of 
Tentative Safeguard Facilities in Montana," October 8, 1969.
S., Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, Report to 
The House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1970.
8method that permits radar scan on a milliseconds scale. Once the Peri­
meter Acquisition Radar detects an attacking warhead, it tracks the 
warhead, computes the probable intercept point and relays the information 
to an appropriate Missile Site Radar for futher tracking and intercept 
control. A high speed, large capacity data processing system is associ­
ated with each Perimeter Acquisition Radar. The Perimeter Acquisition 
Radar is housed in a nuclear hardened structure of some 200 feet square 
at the base and the equivalent to a twelve-story building in height. 
Located with the Perimeter Acquisition Radar are administrative buildings, 
an underground power plant and living quarters for the crew.
The Missile Site Radar performs the function of accepting detected 
attacking warheads from the Perimeter Acquisition Radar, predicting the 
track of the incoming warhead, computing the probable point of intercept, 
readying interceptor missiLua for launch and guiding the interceptor 
missiles to intercept. It also employs phased array radar concepts and 
has associated with it a high speed, large capacity data processing 
system. The Missile Site Radar is housed in a nuclear hardened structure 
of approximately 230 feet square at the base and approximately 120 feet 
in height. In addition to the Missile Site Radar building, power plants, 
administrative buildings, living quarters and interceptor missiles are 
located at. the Missile Site Radar site.
The Spartan missile provides a long-range intercept capability for 
the Safeguard system. It is a three stage, solid propellant missile 
launched from an underground silo. The Spartan missile has a nuclear 
warhead capability and a capability of operating outside the atmosphere.
The Sprint missile provides the Safeguard system with an intercept 
capability at closer ranges. It is a solid propellant missile, ejected
9from its underground silo prior to booster ignition, and has a nuclear 
warhead capability. The Sprint missile is guided in flight by the 
Missile Site Radar.
The data processing subsystem consists of the data processing 
equipment previously identified in association with the Perimeter 
Acquisition Radar and the Missile Site Radar, as well as the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Center that provides central system integration and 
control. The data processing subsystem processes and evaluates the large 
amount of information accumulated by the radars and provides the means 
for the human to control the system.
Scope and Complexity 
A highly complex set of interrelationships and interdependencies 
exist in the development, production, deployment and logistical support 
of the Safeguard system and its field management. Scores of government 
organizations and multi-thousands of industrial concerns are involved in 
the development, manufacturing, construction, installation, support and 
servicing of the system. Some degree of government and industry partici­
pant involvement in the program is illustrated in Chapter II. The 
integration of the efforts of these many program participants is one of 
the most critical challenges to management of the program.
The annual reassessment and incremental deployment approval requires 
a dynamic view of program plans, concepts and techniques. Maintenance of 
this dynamic view is also a critical challenge to management of the 
program which must be faced in the current environment of governmental 
emphasis on economy and austerity.
10
The acqusltlon cost of the full Safeguard program (ultimate twelve
sites) is currently estimated at $10.7 billion (December 1969 price
levels) and represents a $1.6 billion increase in the previous estimated
cost of the program (December 1968 price l e v e l s ) . T h i s  increase is
a result of inflation in price levels, program stretch-out, changes to
12
the system and better estimating of the costs. The presently approved 
Safeguard program and the modified expansion requested by the administra­
tion for Fiscal Year 1971 represents an acquisition cost of some $5.9 
13
billion. With the magnitude of cost involved (approved, requested or 
total) and the tendency of weapon system program costs to escalate from 
early estimates, costs and cost control are of major importance to 
management of the program.
U. S., Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, Report to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Appropriations Defense Sub­
committee, February 24, 1970.
l^ Ibid.
l^ Ibid.
CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZATION DESIGN
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the 
organization design structure of the program so that the subsequent 
analyses can be viewed in their appropriate contexts. The discussion 
progresses from, initially, a view from the broad perspective of total 
program, through both the government and industry organization design 
structures to, finally, the basic field management organization structures 
of both government and industry.
Organization design structure is used in a broader sense than only 
that of formal organization structure. It also includes the philosophies, 
principles and methodologies used by the formal organization structure 
for administration and management of the program.
Composite Overview
The Congressional and Presidential level involvements of the 
Safeguard program have been set aside as those normally associated with 
any major defense weapon program. These normal involvements are com­
pounded by the international arms balance, large dollar investment 
and advanced technology aspects of the Safeguard program.
The Department of Defense is responsible for administration of the 
Safeguard program and has assigned program executive responsibility to
11
12
the Department of the Army. Western Electric Company has been selected 
as the prime contractor for the program.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the composite organization design 
structure of the program. Within the government organization there is a 
central flow from the executive responsibility of the Secretary of the 
Army, through the project/system management embodied in the Safeguard 
System Manager, to field management reflected by the Safeguard System 
Command. Within the industry sector there is a central flow from the 
prime contractor responsibility of Western Electric Company, through the 
defense programs focus of the Defense Activities Division, to the field 
management orientation of the Western Electric Project Organization.^ 
Figure 1 by no means illustrates the magnitude and complexity of 
total program participants. Its purpose is only to provide an initial 
reference framework for the more detailed subsequent analyses. A 
generalized correlation of the two organization design structures can 
be rationalized from the figure, although direct correlations between 
the government and industry program organizations are difficult. This 
difficulty contributes to the complexity of integration of the program.
A different perspective can be obtained from Figure 2. This figure 
reflects an oversimplification of the organization design structure for 
the program from the perspective of system and support equipment develop­
ment, production and installation. Western Electric Company as prime
The two major segments of the Safeguard program, research and 
development and production and deployment, are the responsibilities, 
respectively, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Western Electric 
Project Organization. To alleviate misinterpretations, subsequent 
reference to Western Electric Company includes equal reference to the 
Bell Telephone Laboratories.
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contractor, is responsible for the integration of the equipment into a 
composite system, as well as having prime development and production 
responsibility for the data processing subsystem and for special training 
equipment. McDonnell-Douglas Company has prime development and production 
responsibility for the Spartan missile, as do the Martin Company for the 
Sprint missile, Raytheon Company for the Missile Site Radar and General 
Electric Company for the Perimeter Acquisition Radar. Certain government 
organizations also have prime development and production responsibilities 
for equipment and support areas. These are illustrated by the Atomic 
Energy Commission responsibility for warheads, the Strategic Communications 
Command responsibility for communications equipment and the Corps of 
Engineers responsibility for physical sites.
There are other equipment and support areas associated with the 
system in addition to those shown in Figure 2. These additional areas 
fit into either the Western Electric Ccsnpany system integration responsi­
bility, or into one of the subsystems of special areas. The development, 
production and installation responsibilities of the different industrial 
concerns and government organizations are indicative of the complexity of 
integration requirements in the program.
The equipment perspective of the program is a pyramidical arrange­
ment, with Figure 2 reflecting the major elements of the upper two levels 
of the equipment pyramid of the system. To illustrate the complexity of 
the equipment arrangement for the program, Raytheon Company responsibility 
for development and production of the Missile Site Radar requires use of 
digital racks produced by Western Electric Company and supplied to 
Raytheon Company. The manufacturing of the digital racks by Western
16
Electric involves use of integrated circuit packages that are produced 
by three other industrial concerns and supplied to Western Electric 
Company. The Raytheon Company responsibility must be discharged within 
the constraints imposed by Western Electric Company as the integrator of 
system equipment, as prime contractor and, through the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, as the system design agency.
The contractual concept for the Safeguard program is based on a 
comprehensive government contract with Western Electric Company for 
almost all of the industry requirements of the program. Western Electric 
Company, in turn, subcontracts with other industrial concerns for certain 
program areas. For example, it subcontracts with Bell Telephone Labora­
tories, a sister American Telephone and Telegraph Company element, for 
design agency services and for development of the system. Equipment 
subsystem development, production and installation is subcontracted by 
Western Electric Company to such industrial concerns as Raytheon Company, 
General Electric Company, McDonnell-Douglas Company, Martin Company, 
Lockheed Company, and many others.
Under such a contractual arrangement, the government does not deal 
directly with the industrial concerns responsible for development, pro­
duction and installation of subsystems. Western Electric Company acts 
as the intermediary between the government and industrial concerns 
responsible for subsystems. Consequently, the government must depend 
upon the Western Electric Company for management of the industrial 
efforts of the program, with the exception of a small number of direct 
government-industry contracts that are outside the Western Electric 
Company "umbrella" coverage. Obviously, the company occupies a position
17
of mutual responsibility in field management of the Safeguard program. 
Interface of the government and industry organization design structures 
is of major importance in accomplishing program objectives.
Government Structure
The Safeguard program employs the system manager concept of 
2
management. Under the system manager concept, the Secretary of the 
Army designates an individual to exercise centralized management at 
Department of the Army level for projects that meet one or more of the
3
following criteria;
1. A system whose development and deployment would signi­
ficantly influence, for an extensive period of time, national interest 
elements other than those of a purely military nature.
2. Hardware system subelements or components are antici­
pated to require exceptional and lengthy study and experimental effort.
3. A system whose nonmaterial subelements cannot yet be
optimized.
4. Definitive cost and schedule data for the system depends 
on trade-off studies that cannot yet be undertaken.
The Safeguard program meets these criteria for system management.
The Secretary of the Army has designated the Safeguard program for 
system management and has appointed a Safeguard System Manager and 
established a Safeguard System Organization to accomplish the government
2
U. s.. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 
No. 5010.14, "System/Project Management," May, 1965.
S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 70-17, "System/ 
Project Management," (Washington: The Adjutant General, 1968).
18
4
system management. Figure 3 reflects the Safeguard System Organization. 
The Safeguard System Manager and the Safeguard System Office are located 
in the Washington, D.C. area, the Safeguard System Evaluation Agency at 
the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and the Safeguard System 
Command at Huntsville, Alabama.
The System Manager exercises operational control over material 
development and coordination and directive authority over nonmaterial 
oriented activities of the program. The System Office provides a staff 
to assist the System Manager in his direct responsibilities and maintains 
continual liaison with other government organizations involved in the 
program, particularily at the Department of the Army, Department of 
Defense and legislative levels. The System Evaluation Agency provides 
the System Manager with the capability of performing independent studies 
and tests to insure that the system will meet required standards and 
established system objectives. The System Command is the major field 
management element of the System Organization and is responsibile for 
the development, deployment and activation of the system.
The use of the system manager concept might be construed as a 
straight-forward, uncomplicated management environment for the Safeguard 
program. If the System Organization (Figure 3) represented the only 
government program participants, this would be the case. This is not 
the actual case, as there are many government organizations outside the 
System Organization that play major roles in accomplishing Safeguard 
program objectives.
4
U. S., Department of the Army, "System Charter, Safeguard System,"
June 20, 1969.
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Figure 4 Illustrates the scope and complexity of government program 
participants. Although it does not reflect all government program 
participants, it suffices to illustrate government program participant 
complexity.
The Assistant Secretary level at Department of Defense (particularly 
the Assistant Secretaries for Installation and Logistics and Comptroller, 
as well as the Director, Defense Research and Engineering) and Department 
of the Army (particularly the Assistant Secretaries for Installations and 
Logistics, Financial Management and Research and Development) provide 
policy direction and program monitoring and assessment. The Assistant 
Secretary level at Department of the Army functions through an Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Review Group whose mission is to assure cost effective­
ness and reliable performance of the system.^
Within the Department of the Army General Staff, service-wide 
functional responsibility is assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics, Chief of Research and Development and Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Force Development, for those specified functions. Safeguard 
program activities falling within the scope of these service-wide 
responsibilities must be coordinated with the appropriate General Staff 
element.
Among the major Army commands, the Army Material Command, Army Air 
Defense Command, Corps of Engineers, Continental Army Command and Strategic 
Communications Command each plays a vital role in accomplishing program 
objectives.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army Memorandum 
67-449, "Nike-X Program Review Group," November 15, 1967.
SAFEGUARD
SYSTEM
ORGANIZATION
SECT OF 
DEFENSE
A S T  SECT 
COMPT
DIR, DEF 
RES & ENGR
AST SECT 
INST & LOG
DEP CHIEF 
STAFF, LOG
CHIEF OF 
RES & DEV
SECT OF 
ARMY
SAFEGUARD 
SYST MGR
A S T  SECT 
FIN MGMT
A S T  CHIEF 
STAFF, FOR 
DEV
CHIEF 
OF STAFF
HVILLE
OFFICE
SAFEGUARD 
CTL TRNG 
FAC
A S T  SECT 
INST & LOG
ENGR DIV 
HVILLE
SAFEGUARD 
LOG CMD
A S T  SECT 
RES & DEV
SAFEGUARD 
COMMO AG
MUNITIONS
CMD
SAFEGUARD 
TEST & EVAL
ARMY BAL 
MSL DEV
CONTINENTAL 
ARMY CMD
CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS
SAFEGUARD 
SYST CMD
ARMY
MATERIEL
CMD
STRATEGIC 
COMMO CMD
ARMY AIR 
DEF CMD
FIG. 4 . — MAJOR GOVERNMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
22
The Army Material Command provides traditional supply and mainten­
ance support for the system.^ This support is provided through a special 
Safeguard agency, the Safeguard Logistics Command, that is co-located with 
the Safeguard System Command and through use of standard commodity com­
mands. The use of standard commodity commands is illustrated by the 
Munitions Command providing Safeguard program missile motor loading support.
The Army Air Defense Command is the ultimate user, or customer, of 
the Safeguard system.^ At the present time they are identifying user 
requirements and training, personnel manning requirements and support 
equipment criterion. The Continental Army Command is responsible for 
training system operating personnel and for maintenance and supply of
g
site facilities. A special Safeguard agency, the Safeguard Central 
Training Facility, has been established to provide the required operator 
training support.
The Corps of Engineers is responsible for site selection and building 
9
construction. Another special Safeguard agency, the Huntsville Division, 
has been established to meet this requirement. The Strategic Communi­
cations Command is responsible for development, installation and operation
U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the 
Array, CSSSO-OP Letter, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment-USAMC," 
October 4, 1968.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, CSSSO-OP Letter, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment- 
ARADCOM," October 4, 1968.
g
U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, CSSSO-OP Letter, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignraent- 
USCONARC," October 4, 1968.
9
U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, CSSSO-OP Letter, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment-Chief 
of Engineers," October 4, 1968.
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of data links and voice communications within and between s i t e s . A  
special Safeguard agency, the Safeguard Communications Agency, has been 
established to provide this required support. The Advanced Ballistic 
Missile Defense Agency is responsible for providing advanced ballistic 
missile defense information for inclusion consideration in the Safeguard 
p r o g r a m . A  special agency, the Huntsville Office, has been established 
to perform this function. This special agency is also co-located with 
the Safeguard System Command.
Each of these major Army command special agencies must be integrated 
into a field management composite. The Safeguard System Command is 
responsible for this synthesization effort. The co-location of the 
Safeguard Logistics Command; the Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers; 
and the Huntsville Office, Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency; 
with the Safeguard System Command, reduces the effort in achieving a 
composite field management approach but does not alleviate all problems 
involved in integrating such diverse activities.
With the number of major Army Commands involved in the Safeguard 
program, it is evident that coordination and integration of both the 
policy and field management aspects of the program are of major concern. 
The Safeguard System Organization exists for the purpose of providing the 
required coordination and integration at both the policy and field manage- 
levels. Recognizing this mission for the Safeguard System Organization,
5., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the
Array, CSSSO-OP Letter, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment-
USASTRATCOM," October 4, 1968.
5., Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force
Development, Letter Establishing the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense
Agency, March 1, 1968.
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Figure 5 illustrates the interrelationships involved. The dotted line 
running from the major Army commands level to the Safeguard System Manager 
and Office reflects the coordination and integration exercised by the 
Safeguard System Manager for the policy level. The assignment of the 
System Manager to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army represents 
the centralized program focus that is reflected to the Department of the 
Army, Department of Defense and other comparable levels.
The dotted lines running from the specialized Safeguard agencies 
level to the Safeguard System Command reflects the field management coordi­
nation and integration of the program. The Safeguard System Command is 
responsible for the coordination and integration of the other field manage­
ment organizations associated with the program.
To discharge this responsibility, the Safeguard System Command is
organized into three functional directorates, one specialized directorate,
four service type staff offices and nine support, or "housekeeping," type 
12
staff offices. Figure 6 summarizes the Safeguard System Command formal 
organization structure.
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Directorate is respon­
sible for research, test and development engineering on Safeguard components 
and the integrated Safeguard system. The Production and Logistics 
Directorate is responsible for production management, production engineer­
ing, quality engineering, production testing and production and stockpile 
reliability of the equipment of the approved program. The Site Activation 
Directorate is responsible for site selection and validation, monitoring of
12
U, S., Department of the Army, Safeguard System Command, SAFSCOM 
Regulation No. 10-1, "Organization and Management Manual," November 19, 1969.
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Corps of Engineer construction activities, equipment installation, system 
test and validation of system performance at each Safeguard site. To 
provide the emphasis and control necessary at each site, the Site Activa­
tion Directorate will establish and control Site Activation Commands for 
each site. These Site Activation Commands will coordinate and integrate 
government and industry efforts directly associated with activation of 
particular sites.
The Kwajalein Range Directorate is responsible for the operation, 
control and maintenance of the research, development, test and evaluation 
activities at Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean. This is where 
most field testing of Safeguard subsystems and major assemblies is carried 
out. The Kwajalein Range Directorate is assigned to the Office of the 
Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Array, but is attached 
to the Safeguard System Command for administrative control. This arrange­
ment is the result of a major share of the Kwajalein Range activities being 
associated with the Safeguard program.
The thirteen staff offices are grouped into service and support types. 
They provide to the Safeguard System Command, as well as selected support 
to the Safeguard System Organization, specialized and routine support and 
administrative services.
Each of the three functional directorates represents a particular 
phase in the life of the weapon system. The transfer of responsibility for 
equipment and activities from one phase to the next and the impact of 
activities in one phase on another futher illustrates the integration 
demands of the program.
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An example of a transfer of responsibility from one phase to another 
illustrates the integrative concerns of government field management. The 
Research and Development Directorate is responsible for the design of the 
system equipment. This responsibility goes to the point of releasing a 
design package (drawings, specifications, etc.) to production. The 
Production and Logistics Directorate is responsible for production of the 
system equipment. They must use the design packages provided by the 
Research and Development Directorate for manufacturing of the equipment 
and assurance of the quality and reliability of the equipment. The Site 
Activation Directorate is responsible for installation of the equipment 
at a physical site and test of equipment installed. To do so, they must 
use the design packages for equipment integration and as bases for test 
of installed equipment. Such sequential phasing of responsibility is 
indicative of the interdependencies of responsibility involved in the 
government concept of field management.
The Safeguard System Command encompasses approximately one thousand 
military and civilian personnel. This number is small due to the govern­
ment use of a concept of minimum commitment of dedicated organizational 
resources (both organization elements and personnel) necessary to achieve 
an acceptable level of effectiveness and efficiency in management of the 
program. Maximum use is made of existing personnel resources and organi­
zation elements and a minimum amount of dedicated Safeguard program 
special organizations are created.
The minimization of special Safeguard program organizations and 
dedicated personnel forces use of existing government organizations for 
accomplishing program objectives. The use of existing organizations
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requires the delineation of participants program responsibilities in a 
different manner than that normally associated with responsibility assign­
ments. The existing organizations have their own basic responsibility and 
the special Safeguard support responsibility as well. The establishment 
of special Safeguard field management elements within these existing 
organizations reduces the difficulty of emphasizing the Safeguard program. 
Their existance does not eliminate the competition between programs 
assigned to the organizations. The Safeguard System Organization is 
responsible for assuring that Safeguard Program emphisis is maintained 
within the environment of competing programs.
Industry Structure
Western Electric Company uses a project management concept as its
basis for industry field management. The Western Electric Project
Organization performs this project management function.
Figure 7 provides an overview of the general Western Electric Company
13
organization design structure. The concern of this study will be 
restricted, primarily, to the Defense Activities and Bell Telephone 
Laboratories portions of the general Western Electric Company organization 
design structure. Although the Bell Telephone Laboratories are a separate 
element in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company structure, the 
President, Western Electric Company, supervises Company interests in the 
Bell Telephone Laboratories as they pertain to the Safeguard program.
As previously noted, the Bell Telephone Laboratories are included in any 
reference to Western Electric Company in this study.
13
Western Electric Company, "Charts on General Executive Organiza­
tion," June 15, 1969.
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Figure 8 reflects the Safeguard program structure within the
14
Defense Activities portion of the Western Electric Company. The 
Executive Vice President for Defense Activities has overall industry 
responsibility for the Safeguard program. To discharge this responsi­
bility, he uses two major organizational groupings. The first is the 
Western Electric Project Organization, the primary industry field manage­
ment element, headed by a Vice President for the Safeguard System. The 
second grouping consists of selected Bell Telephone Laboratories elements, 
headed by a Vice President of Military Development Programs. These element 
are responsible for development and design of the Safeguard system and 
the providing of scientific support to the Western Electric Project 
Organization in the production and installation of the system equipment.
The Bell Telephone Laboratories also serves as the design agency for the 
system.
Although there are two major groupings involved in the industry 
program efforts, attention is directed, basically, to the Western Electric 
Project Organization. This is due to the Western Electric Project Organi­
zation being the primary industry field management element and the lead 
program element of the Western Electric Company for the Safeguard program.
Figure 9 illustrates the general Western Electric Project Organization 
15
structure. Organizational elements shown with a solid line are integral 
parts of the Western Electric Project Organization. Elements shown with a
14
Western Electric Company, Presentation at the Safeguard Executive ■ 
Review Board Meeting, "Systems Analysis and Program Integration," May, 1969.
^^Westem Electric Company, Defense Activities, Organization Charts 
of Directors of Project Engineering and Operations, Systems Engineering 
and Project Control, Site Engineering and Operations, and Support Organi­
zations, December 16, 1969.
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dotted line are attached to the Western Electric Project Organization to 
provide support for the Safeguard program but are a formal part of some 
other company organizational element.
The Systems Engineering and Project Control element is responsible 
for integration of the overall industry program effort, both from the 
context of program integration (Project Control) and equipment integration 
(Systems Engineering). It is also responsible for industry management of 
the customer-supplier contractual arrangement (Contract Management) with 
the government and the Western Electric Project Organization coordination 
of the Bell Telephone Laboratories research and development and system 
design activities. (Safeguard Design Center)
The Project Engineering and Operations element is responsible for 
management of the industry efforts associated with hardware subsystems 
(Radars and Data Processing representing the Perimeter Acquisition Radar, 
Missile Site Radar and Data Processors; and Missiles representing the 
Spartan and Sprint missiles). It is also responsible for the coordination 
of the ancillary areas of purchasing supplies and services from subcon­
tractors and vendors and the transportation of equipment from manufacturing 
locations to deployment sites and between manufacturing locations.
The Site Engineering and Operations element is responsible for 
development of equipment and system test criteria and procedures (Research 
and Development Support and Test Development) and the coordination of 
overall activities associated with activation of physical sites (Site 
Activation). It is also responsible for coordinating equipment installation 
at physical sites and testing of the installed equipment (Site Installation 
and Test Engineering). It is responsible for development of maintenance
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procedures and requirements, providing logistical support and training 
requirements and instructions for operator and maintenance personnel 
(Maintenance, Logistics and Training Engineering). The Safeguard Contract­
ing element is a Western Electric Company corporate level group attached to 
the Western Electric Project Organization to provide specialized contracting 
services such as negotiations, pricing and legal support, to the industry 
segment of the program.
It is apparent that the industry field management organization design 
structure is based on an orientation different than that used as the basis 
for the government organization design structure. The industry organiza­
tion design is aligned to overview functions (such as Project Control and 
Systems Engineering), product groupings (such as Radars and Data Processing 
and Missiles) and service areas (such as Site Installation and Test Engi­
neering and Maintenance, Logistics and Training Engineering). The govern­
ment organization design is aligned to phases in the life of a weapons 
program (Research and Development, Production and Logistics, and Site 
Activation). Such differences in basic alignment of the organization design 
structures impedes the mutual interface of the two organizations and con­
tributes to the need for program integration.
Government-Industry Interface
The management process for development of Army systems normally 
follows a life cycle phasing that involves concept formulation, contract 
definition, development and production, and operations and disposal.
These formal phases have distinct definitions and identified subphases.
■
U. S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 11-25, "The 
Management Process for Development of Army Systems," (Washington; The 
Adjutant General, 1968).
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Due to the evolutionary nature of the Safeguard system, it does not directly
follow the standard system life cycle phases.
To understand the Safeguard program it is necessary to refer to more 
commonly used phases in the life of a weapon program. The commonly used
phases are research, development, procurement, production, site activation
and logistic support. Subsequent discussion will use these common phases 
grouped into arrangements of research and development, procurement and 
production, deployment (or site activation) and logistic support. These 
groupings generally correspond to the Safeguard System Command organization 
design structure and are commonly understood between government and 
industry field management.
The Safeguard program is presently in the research and development, 
procurement and production, deployment and logistic support planning phases, 
concurrently. The program involvement in multiple phases is the result of 
the concurrency of schedule that results from a complex system. Figure 10 
illustrates the formal and common use phases of a system life cycle.
During the research and development phase, the government provides 
overall program direction, review and the definition of the threat for 
which the system is being designed to counter. During the production and 
deployment phases, the government provides overall program direction; 
evaluation and approval; and the definition of program requirements, 
deployment concepts and objectives.
During the research and development phase, industry responsibility 
is discharged through efforts of both the Bell Telephone Laboratories and 
the Western Electric Project Organization. The Bell Telephone Laboratories 
directs the development and design efforts and serves as the system design
TIME
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agency. The Western Electric Project Organization functions as the prime 
contractor. As the system design agency, Bell Telephone Laboratories is 
responsible for analysis of the threat, definition of system concept, 
development of system design and control of subcontractor design agencies. 
The Western Electric Project Organization monitors the design for tactical 
application and provides engineering services and installation and test 
engineering support.
During the production and deployment phases, the Western Electric 
Project Organization provides program and systems analysis, systems 
engineering, system and program integration, program technical direction 
and project control of production, installation and test activities 
performed by elements of Western Electric Company and the other industry 
subcontractors. The Bell Telephone Laboratories provide design control, 
engineering support and technical assistance.
With such apparent differences in organization design structures, 
it seems pertinent to ask how the government and industry efforts are 
interfaced and how the overall program is integrated. The question of 
how the program is integrated will be discussed in Chapter III. The 
question of organization design interface is germane to the present 
discussion.
Government-industry organization design interface for the Safeguard 
program must be viewed from two levels, that of field management and that 
of policy formulation. From the viewpoint of field management, organization
Each subcontractor for an equipment subsystem has the design 
responsibility for the particular equipment subsystem but must operate 
within the limitations imposed by Western Electric Company as the prime 
contractor and the Bell Telephone Laboratories as the system design agency.
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design interface plays a sensitive role in program accomplishment. The 
govemment-industry responsibility for implementation of the program and 
for its field management makes interface of the two organizations manda­
tory. From the viewpoint of policy formulation, govemment-industry 
interface is of less significance. This is due to the monistic nature 
of government responsibility for policy formulation. Industry's policy 
role is restricted to that of providing advice to the government.
Govemment-industry organization design interface is accomplished, 
primarily, between the Safeguard System Command and the Western Electric 
Project Organization. This does not mean that other government program 
participants have no field management interface with the Western Electric 
Project Organization. It does mean that all government program participant 
organizations interface with the Westem Electric Project Organization 
either through the Safeguard System Command or in coordination with it.
The Safeguard System Command performs the function of providing the 
central integrative point for government field management.
The discussion of govemment-industry interface has used the Westem 
Electric Project Organization as the only industry element involved in 
field management interface. This results from the Western Electric Company 
having specifically designated the Western Electric Project Organization 
for central field management of all industry activities on the Safeguard 
program and the only industry organization for govemment program partici­
pants to interface with. The industry assignment of field management 
responsibility is more distinct than that of the govemment. This is 
partially the result of governmental emphasis on minimizing organizational 
resources to the program and emphasizing maximum utilization of existing 
resources.
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In summary, the govemment-industry interface in field management 
of the Safeguard program occurs primarily between the Safeguard System 
Command and the Western Electric Project Organization and involves organ­
izations with design structures that are incompatible for easy interface.
CHAPTER III
PROGRAM INTEGRATION
What It Is and Why It Is Necessary 
Program integration is required in all complex governmental 
programs. It is not unique to defense weapon programs but becomes 
extremely critical in such programs. Program integration refers to a 
macro perspective, or an emphasis on the synthesization of pieces into 
a whole. In the Safeguard program, program integration means the 
concern for synthesization of system phases, product groupings, support 
and service areas, and organizational elements into a composite program. 
Why is program integration a necessary concern in the Safeguard 
program? To answer this question, consideration of the major ingredients 
of the program and their magnitude provides a first illustration. The 
equipment and services for the program involves multi-thousands of 
industrial concerns (conservatively estimated to be in excess of ten 
thousand). Govemment program participants can be counted on a multi­
score basis. With this large number of program participants, both 
govemment and industry, it is evident that a major emphasis on integration 
is mandatory. Program costs can be expressed in multi-billions of dollars, 
further supporting the necessity for program integration.
Development and deployment of the Safeguard system requires the 
integration of a wide spectrum of functions associated with the overall
41
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defense system.^ Examples of the range of functions involved can be seen 
in the "state-of-the-art” of research and development required for the 
program, construction of equipment and facilities for a nuclear environ­
ment, management of contractual arrangements that are measurable on a 
multi-billion dollar scale, and scheduling of the production and instal­
lation of multi-thousands of pieces of equipment required for a deployed 
system. These examples are compounded by the large number of industry and 
govemment program participants that must be integrated into a composite 
Safeguard program*
As an example of the mandatory requirement for program integration 
emphasis, activation of a Safeguard site can be considered. Numerous and 
diverse actions and events must happen during a concurrent time period.
The site location must be selected, physically acquired and building and 
services required for the equipment and personnel constructed. The system 
equipment must be produced, tested and shipped to the site. This effort 
assumes that the required equipment has been designed and developed in 
sufficient time for the production of the equipment to have been possible.
The total Safeguard system is not designed and released for produc­
tion as a complete design package. The overall system concept is 
established and equipment requirements specified at the initiation of the 
program. Actual design of equipment is dependent upon the time required 
for installation at the first site and the length of time necessary to 
produce and ship it. This approach means that the system is being 
designed, produced, installed and tested concurrently. Under such a
General William G. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Address to the Tennessee Valley Chapter, Association of the United 
States Army, Huntsville, Alabama, December 16, 1969.
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concurrent arrangement it can easily be seen that a problem arising in 
one phase would have an adverse impact on other phases of the program.
Due to the size and complexity of the Safeguard program equipment, 
as well as the small number of sites involved, maSS-production approaches 
are not necessarily applicable to some of the equipment. Most of the 
equipment assemblies will not be tested in relation to subsystems prior
t
to installation at the tactical sites. This is different than the normal 
defense weapon program concept of testing the equipment as part of an 
operating subsystem and as part of a total tactical system. The Safeguard 
subsystems will not be tested until they are installed at the physical 
tactical sites due to their size and complexity. The description of 
equipment subsystems (Chapter I) reflected the physical size involved in 
the equipment, especially the radars. Utilization of such an approach 
does not mean that the equipment is not tested for design feasibility, 
operational standards and compatibility as a total operational system.
Such testing is presently being done at the Safeguard research and 
development site at Kwajalein Missile Range. Utilization of this approach 
means that the equipment that will be used at a tactical site has not been 
tested at the system, subsystem and major assembly levels prior to its 
installation at the tactical site.
The equipment installation at a tactical site is spread over a 
lengthy period of time. Subassemblies and chassis pieces of equipment are 
shipped to the tactical site to meet a specific installation requirement 
date. This demands a closely phased schedule of many pieces of equipment 
that must be produced and shipped to meet the required installation dates. 
The production effort is, therefore, based on meeting the required dates
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for tactical site installation and not for mass production of the total 
equipment requirements for the system. The production effort is further 
complicated by the annual reassessment and incremental authorization of 
the program. As noted in Chapter I, the initial authorization of 
Safeguard pertained to only two sites and the Fiscal Year 1971 adminis­
tration proposal for the program was for one additional site and long 
lead-time authorization for five additional sites. Such "piece-meal" 
approvals preclude the use of standard contracting and production 
techniques. The production effort must be continually adjusted to pro­
vide the equipment required for approved program needs and at the same 
time remain capable of providing the equipment needed for subsequent 
increments of the program, assuming the subsequent increments will be 
approved during some future annual program reassessment.
Supportive of development, production, test and installation of 
equipment, are activities associated with the training of operational and 
maintenance personnel, development of data processing software (computer 
programs), provision of logistics requirements and similar type support 
efforts. These support area efforts occur during concurrent time periods 
and must be integrated with the equipment oriented efforts.
The preceding illustrations are indicative of the interrelatedness 
and interdependency of efforts involved in accomplishment of program 
objectives. Program integration is the concern for ensuring that all of 
these events and actions will happen when they should, how they should 
and as they should.
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Government Concept
With the government use of a system management concept, it could 
be assumed that the system management organization would be aligned to 
achieve the integration requirements of the program. Such an assumption 
is true on a total Safeguard program basis but not necessarily true for 
field management of the program.
The Safeguard System Command, as the primary government field 
management organization, is functionally aligned in its organization 
design structure. The functional alignment is a triad of research and 
development, production and logistics, and site activation organizations. 
The Safeguard System Command functional alignment provides effective 
functional integration but less than optimum total field management 
integration.
The Research and Development Directorate functionally integrates 
research and development concerns through its own efforts; coordination 
of the Huntsville Office, Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency; 
and primary government direction and control of the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories research, development and system design activities.
The Production and Logistics Directorate functionally integrates 
the areas of production and logistic support through its own efforts; 
coordinates the Safeguard Logistic Command contractor activities and 
provides the primary government interface with industry for production 
and logistics. This directorate does not functionally integrate the 
procurement area as is normally the case for a production organization. 
Functional integration of the procurement area is the responsibility 
of a staff office, the Contracts Office. This staff office is organized.
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staffed and aligned to provide service and not to functionally manage a 
major area of the program.
The Site Activation Directorate functionally integrates the 
installation and site activation phases through its own efforts. It also 
coordinates the Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers, and the Safeguard 
Central Training Facility; and provides the primary government interface 
with industry for installation and site activation activities.
By using a functional orientation in its organization design 
structure, one might assume that some organization design element of the 
government field management organization is responsible for integrating 
the separate functional areas into a composite whole. This is not the 
case with the Safeguard System Command. There is no identifiable organi­
zation design element with responsibility for integration of the total 
field management effort at less than the level of the Commanding General 
and his personal staff. The thirteen staff offices of the Safeguard 
System Command each have a distinct, and most often specialized, area 
of responsibility. The Comptroller and Director of Programs staff office 
is the nearest to such an overall program integration organization, yet 
the emphasis of this element is heavily oriented to financial and 
budgetary matters.
The composite field management program integration effort in the 
Safeguard System Command is "ad-hoc," or informal, in nature. Inter­
directorate coordination, periodic Command and directorate reviews, 
special studies groups, "Task Forces," and personal coordination by 
the Commanding General and his personal staff are used as the basic 
techniques for achievement of composite program integration. The
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organization design structure in government field management channels 
the program integration emphasis towards functional orientation but it 
does not provide an organization design element for overall integration 
at less than the level of the Commanding General and his personal staff.
Industry Concept
Western Electric Company's approach to field management program
integration is significantly different than that of the Safeguard System
Command. Functional orientation by program phase is not used in the
industry approach as it is in the government approach. Industry's
2
approach is based on:
1. Identification and analysis of system product requirements.
2. Definition and evaluation of the functions and tasks 
required to accomplish program objectives.
3. Identification of interrelationships and interfaces 
required to accomplish program objectives.
4. Assignment and allocation of responsibilities for products, 
functions and tasks to organizations.
5. Establishment of a project organization to coordinate and 
integrate the activities of the program.
The industry alignment is heavily oriented to a product base. The
product groups identified for the program are sites, equipment and
material, computer software, communications, repair parts, operating and
3
maintenance documentation, training aids and personnel training.
Western Electric Company, Presentation at the Safeguard Executive 
Review Board Meeting, "Systems Analysis and Program Integration," May, 1969,
^Ibid.
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The Project Control element of the Western Electric Project 
Organization is responsible for industry field management program
4
integration. Although structurally assigned to the Systems Engineering 
and Project Control organization, the Project Control element is 
responsible for program integration throughout the total of the Western 
Electric Project Organization. The Project Control element and the 
function of composite program integration are overlays superimposed on 
the industry organization design structure for field management. The 
clearly identifiable program integration element for industry and its 
overlay character are distinctively different than that of government 
field management organization design.
Although the industry organization design structure has a clearly 
identifiable element for composite program integration, its effectiveness 
in achieving integration is diluted by its emphasis on formality. Much 
of the element's efforts are devoted to the accumulation and presentation 
of masses of graphically portrayed information that is marginal in its 
usefulness relative to integration of the operational aspects of field 
management. Its effectiveness in achieving composite integration of 
the field management of the program is further diluted by its emphasis 
on integration of the efforts associated with satisfactory accomplishment 
of the formal contract requirements between the government and Western 
Electric Company. Such concern for accomplishment of the formal 
contractual requirements is understandable in relation to meeting the 
legal responsibilities imposed on Western Electric Company but does not
4.Western Electric Company, "Safeguard System Management Control 
System," January 16, 1970.
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contribute to the accomplishment of integration of the joint government- 
industry field management efforts.
Government-Industry Composite
The Safeguard System Command and the Western Electric Project 
Organizations are the primary field management organization and have the 
principal responsibilities for field management integration. To dis­
charge this responsibility, they must mutually interface in their 
organization design structures so that integration of field management 
is possible.
A cursory comparison of the organization design structure of the 
Safeguard System Command and the Western Electric Project Organization 
reveals a basic similarity between the two structures. Each has a 
hierarchial apex; Commanding General for the government and a Vice 
President for industry. Each has staff elements to provide service 
and support to the respective organizations, although the number of 
government staff offices far exceeds that of industry and are responsible 
directly to the Commanding General as compared to industry's assignment 
of most of their staff elements to one of the major operational elements. 
Each organization design structure has three major operating elements; 
Research and Development, Production and Logistics, and Site Activation 
Directorates for the government and Systems Engineering and Project 
Control, Project Engineering and Operations, and Site Engineering and 
Operations elements for industry.
If the respective organization design structures for field manage­
ment are contrasted. Figure 11 is the result. Research and Development 
Directorate integration of its functional areas would require interface
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with the Site Engineering and Operations element for research and 
development support and test development; the Project Engineering and 
Operations element for hardware concerns; and the Systems Engineering 
and Project Control element for project control, systems engineering, 
contract management, design and advanced engineering.
Production and Logistics Directorate integration of its functional 
areas would require interface with Project Engineering and Operations 
for hardware production. Site Engineering and Operations for maintenance 
and logistics, and Systems Engineering and Project Control for all of its 
sub-areas. Site Activation Directorate integration of its functional 
areas would require interface with Site Engineering and Operations for 
site activation, site installation, test and training; and with Systems 
Engineering and Project Control for all of its sub-areas with the 
exception of design.
Staff offices aligned to special programs, or areas, such as product 
assurance, configuration management and value engineering, assist the 
Commanding General and his personal staff in performing the composite 
government program integration function for these particular specialized 
areas. This assistance is diluted by most of the government specialized 
areas having no direct correlatable industry organization design structure 
element within the three top levels of the industry organization design 
structure.
When the industry structure for field management is contrasted with 
the government structure. Figure 12 is the result. Without a detailed 
discussion, it is evident that the interfaces of this figure are different 
than those identified in Figure 11. The existance of two sets of
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organization design interfaces (as reflected by Figures II and 12) 
illustrates the difficulty of integrating the field management program.
The difference in basic orientation in the government and industry 
organization design structures results in unclear mutual interfaces. The 
absence of a clearly defined primary program integration element within 
the government results in the Commanding General and his personal staff 
having to function in a divided mode; partially as the hierarchial apex 
of the government field management organization and partially as the 
composite program integration element for government field management.
The absence of a clearly defined government program integration element 
also dilutes the effectiveness of the industry integration element by 
denying it an interface point below the level of the Commanding General 
and his personal staff.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The preceding emphasis has focused on system and program orienta­
tions, formal government and industry organization design structures and 
the importance of program integration to field management of the Safeguard 
program. To assess the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of this program so that the 
results are pertinent to the specific program and projectable to other 
similar programs, it is necessary to establish a theoretical reference 
framework for the more detailed subsequent analyses. Such a framework 
must be manageable in size.
The necessary limitation of scope can be accomplished by restricting 
the theoretical reference framework as follows:
1. The dependent variables are specified as organization 
design and program integration and will be further limited to their 
mutual interrelatedness relative to field management of the Safeguard 
program.
2. An open system model will be used for the subsequent
analyses.
3. Independent variables selected for use in the model must 
meet the following criteria:
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a. Pertinent to the interrelatedness of the two 
dependent variables.
b. Ccsranon elements in field management of the Safeguard 
program and common to other similar type programs.
c. Susceptible to manipulation in a system model.
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model must provide the capability of using ideas 
from- multiple sources, theoretically sound, and capable of being operation­
alized. A system model provides such necessary flexibility. It is 
operationally bounded, yet conscious of external influences. It is 
structured, yet dynamic in the sense of a continual flow. It is a 
complete entity in itself, yet composed of lesser entities that are also 
complete in themselves.
Organization design represents the more structured and static aspects 
of the subject while program integration represents the fluid and dynamic 
aspects. The system model offers a relatively comparative structure for 
the non-structured elements that are critical to the identification and 
evaluation of the interrelationship of organization design and program 
integration in field management of the Safeguard program.
Figure 13 reflects the conceptual system model used in the study.
The model generally parallels the system model concept used by Haberstroh.^ 
There are inputs to the system, a conversion or transmission process, and 
output from the system. Feedback occurs in the system from output results
Chadwich J. Haberstroh, "Organization Design and Systems Analysis," 
in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1965), pp. 1171-1212.
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and the conversion process. Through feedback these results are channelled 
back to the input for system adjustment and stabilization. There is a 
conceptual boundary around the system to restrict its scope sufficiently 
to allow it to operate as an entity. The system operates within many 
different environments, each of which influences, and is influenced 
by, the system represented by the model. The system is also dynamic.
The conceptual model reflected in Figure 13 must be transposed to 
an operational, or applied, mode before it can be directly applicable to 
the prime concern of identifying and assessing the interrelationship of 
organization design and program integration in field management of the 
Safeguard program. The purpose of the subsequent section is the trans­
position from the conceptual to an operational system model.
Operational Model
Figure 14 portrays the operational model. The model is predictive
in purpose. Its intent is to simulate the environmental dynamics and
2
allow a symbolic manipulation of the variables selected.
The attempt to operationally integrate diverse concepts that come 
from multiple sources is somewhat akin to the attempts to develop a 
universal religion or to formulate general principles of administration. 
Although possible utopian in idea, such an attempt is necessary if the 
broad context of integration is to be adequately addressed in an assess­
ment of the interrelationship of two dependent variables. Faced with 
such a paradox, the critical concerns then become the selection of those 
diverse conceptual variables that are the most optimum in assessing the
2
Fremont A. Shull, Jr., "The Nature and Contribution of Administrative 
Models," Academy of Management Journal, V (August, 1962), pp. 124-138.
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interrelationship involved and the selection of those that are the least 
difficult to operationally synthesize.
From a more practical standpoint, the scope and complexity of many 
current programs and the conceptual ideas involved necessitates the 
operational integration, no matter how difficult the attempt, of diverse 
concepts to adequately reflect the case in point. If the attempt to 
integrate diverse concepts into a composite operational model is not made 
then any model developed is suspect of being parochial in relation to 
the particular study being attempted and not susceptible to projection 
of its results to the broad spectrum of similarities. Such would be the 
situation for this study if a single model, or a normally related set of 
variables, was used.
Assessment of the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of the Safeguard program has a 
two-fold purpose. It assesses the interrelationship of the two dependent 
variables specially in Safeguard field management, but it does so for the 
purpose of attempting to determine the relative nature of such assessment 
results to the broad range of similar programs and situations. With such 
a two-fold purpose, the operational model must encompass attributes that 
tend to substantiate the applicability of results for consideration out­
side the realm of the immediate study situation.
Each of the independent variables selected to represent the concep­
tual model elements also represents a germane consideration in the 
administration of the Safeguard field management program. Each is a 
conceptual consideration that receives emphasis and priority in the 
program. Each is represented by major programs and organizational elements 
oriented to the understanding and accomplishment of the conceptual ideas.
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The ultimate in a conceptual model intended for the assessment of 
the interrelationship of organization design and program integration in 
field management of the Safeguard program and subsequent projection of 
results for similar situation considerations would be the inclusion of all 
conceptual variables pertinent to the immediate study. Such an infinite 
number of variables would complicate the operational model to the extent 
that such a large number of possible interrelationships would be identified 
so as to dilute the application of the results. The expanded inclusion of 
diverse conceptual variables into an operational model appears pertinent 
to the understanding of interrelationships involved in the administration 
of complex programs and will be of continued interest to the author for 
subsequent research.
Attempting to assess and evaluate interrelationships in complex 
programs administration by means of commonly accepted conceptual repre­
sentations is somewhat suspect. The credibility of the results of such 
assessments is influenced by the applicability of the conceptual repre­
sentations employed to the general situation studied. It is somewhat 
like the employment of a specialist in a position that demands a 
generalist. The absence of attempts to integrate diverse conceptual 
variables into a composite model is indicative of the segmented and 
compartmentalized administration of complex programs and the situation 
whereby segments (conceptually) of a program are, in themselves, adequately 
understood but the program, as a total entity, seems to continually 
vibrate and convulse.
Planning is used as the input element of the system model. Ansoff's 
conception of planning as a practical, or applied, tool of administration
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provides a structural context for planning as it is used in the operational
3
model. Use of this concept of planning is directly applicable to the
Western Electric Company portion of the joint government-industry field
management of the Safeguard program. This conception of planning must
be mentally translated for applicability to the Safeguard System Command
because its basis is that of the business firm. Although based on the
business firm, the conception is relevant for visualization of planning
in government activities, such as the Safeguard System Command.
This conception of planning visualizes the principal function of
the organization to be the conversion of physical, human and financial
4
resources into goods and services. Use of a resources conversion 
function orientation is directly applicable to both the government and 
industry field management organizations of the Safeguard program. Each 
of these organizations is responsible for conversion of resources into 
goods and services. The output of goods and services resulting from the 
resources conversion function of the organizations are different for the 
two field management organizations. These differences are the results of 
the two organizations having different objectives, or goals.^
The concept of planning also allows a distinction to be made between 
strategic and operational planning.^ Both the strategic and operational 
planning aspects are considered in the model. Which of the two planning
3
Igor Ansoff, "Planning as a Practical Management Tool," Financial 
Executive, XXXII (June, 1964), pp. 34-37.
4
Ibid.
^The differences in government and industry field management organi­
zation goals are addressed in Chapter V.
^Ansoff, "Planning as a Practical Management Tool."
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orientations is emphasized is one of the sensitive elements in the 
subsequent analyses of the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of the Safeguard program.
The theoretical interrelatedness of planning, using the above 
concept, and goals indicated a general compatibility with another of the 
variables chosen for the model. The difference in the output of goods 
and services of the two field management organizations is also illustra­
tive of a sensitive element (efficiency) that will be considered in the 
subsequent analyses, as well as the importance of program integration 
in mutually synthesizing diverse outputs and goals.
Planning is pertinent to the mutual interrelatedness of organization 
design and program integration. Such pertinence is illustrative by the 
organization design structure interface difficulties resulting from the 
different government and industry field management orientations and 
program integration approaches. Planning is a common element in the 
management of the Safeguard program, as well as common to other similar 
programs. Planning's susceptibility to manipulation in the system model 
appears to be supportable on the basis of its compatibility with the other
variables selected to represent the operational model elements.
7 8
Other variables, such as rationality and purpose factoring are
possible conceptual representations of the input variable of the system
model. Neither is susceptible to manipulation in the operational model
as readily as planning due to their incompatibility with the other
^Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: The
MacMiIlian Company, 1962), Chapter 4.
g
Victor A. Thompson, Modem Organization (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1961), Chapter 2.
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variables selected for use. Rationality and purpose factoring are also 
not common conceptions in the Safeguard program, nor in similar type / 
programs, unless redefined or restructured radically.
Rationality is the concern with the selection of desired alterna­
tives relative to some system of values that allows the consequences of
9
alternatives to be evaluated. As such, it is not susceptible to 
manipulation in a model using other variables such as goals, control, 
efficiency and communications. The difference between the values, based 
on goals, of the government and industry field management organizations 
prohibits the selection of a system of values mutually susceptible to 
alternative evaluation. Planning is a commonly used concept in Safeguard 
program field management, whereas rationality requires interpretation of 
a system of values from the myriad of practical program considerations.
Purpose factoring, or the factoring of general goals into succes­
sively lower and more specific subgoals until routinization or procedur- 
alization is achieved, is not compatible in an operational model with the 
other elements used.^^ This is particularly true relative to use of goals 
to represent the boundary of the analytical model. Although the goals 
variable used in the operational model is aligned to organizational 
goals, the use of another variable in the model that is heavily dependent 
upon a goals concept would create unnecessary confusion.
Similar logical and operational elimination processes can be used 
for other possible input element conceptual representations. It appears 
irrelevant to express the bases for elimination of each possible conceptual
9
Simon, Administrative Behavior. 
^^Thompson, M o d e m  Organization.
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representation of an operational model variable, therefore, only the bases
for the elimination of two possible substitutes is used in relation to
each conceptual model element. Expanding the number of possible conceptual
representations possible and the reasoning why they were not selected
infers that all possible representations are known. Such is not the case.
The relevancy of planning to the organization design aspects of
Safeguard field management is illustrative by the numerous considerations
of planning in the narrative mission and function explanations of both 
11 12
the government and industry field management organizations. It is 
also illustrated by the emphasis placed on it in all aspects of complex 
program considerations and in academic study of organizations.
Control is used as the conceptual variable to represent the conver­
sion process of the operational model. Control, as a concept, is used in 
many different ways. Many of the common conceptions are based on coercive 
foundations. These may range from the domination of one person by 
another to the aim of the organization being the ensurance that organiza­
tion rules are obeyed and orders followed. The coercive based concepts of 
control are not compatible with the other variables selected to represent 
the operational model elements. To be compatible with the other variables, 
control must be conceptualized as near synonymous with coordination.
bitterer's concept of control closely approximates the conceptual­
ization of control that is required for the operational model and as used
^^U.S., Department of the Array, Safeguard System Command, SAFSCOM 
Regulation No. 10-1, "Organization and Management Manual," November 19, 
1969.
12
Western Electric Company, Presentation at the Safeguard Executive 
Review Board Meeting, "Systems Analysis and Program Integration," May, 
1969.
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13
in the subsequent analyses. In this concept, control is used in a
cybernetic and non-coercive sense. It is concerned with both the events
and activities directly related to achievement of major purposes,
14
objectives and goals identified. This concept recognizes that control 
and coordination are closely related and that their principles are 
similar.
This concept is based on a perception of control being a system in 
i t s e l f . T h i s  allows a system perspective to be used in assessing the 
conversion process of the overall operational model. Both open and 
closed control loops are recognized, as are the distinct functions of 
sensor, discriminator and controller, or decision maker, and the 
recognition of time relationships that results in precontrol, current 
control and post control type of control practices.
Control, as a system in itself or as a subsystem, is conducive tc 
mutual assessment in relation with the other selected variables. The 
recognition of both open and closed control systems provides the basis 
for identifying sensitive elements in the subsequent analyses and provides 
two different perspectives for use in evaluation. Which control system, 
open or closed, used is indicative of both the organization design and of 
program integration. This is reflected in the policies and procedures 
used to implement the operational organization design and the program 
integration methodology required to implement the type of control system
13
Joseph A. bitterer. The Analysis of Organization (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 233-255.
\^bid.
^^ Ibid.
’■^ Ibid.
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employed by the organization. This situation will be pursued in more
detail in Chapter VII.
Douglas Sherwin conceptualizes control as "action which adjusts
operations to predetermined standards, and its basis is information in
the hands of m a n a g e r s . T h i s  concept of control is based on process
control systems used in automated industries, such as the chemical and
petroleum industries. It relates, basically, to the closed control
system in the bitterer conceptualization of control.
Sherwin’s approach to control emphasizes that objectives, plans,
programs and organization design charts are neither control or means of 
18
control. These elements are the predetermined standards that are used
to adjust operations in the exercise of control. This distinction is of
importance in evaluation of the interrelationship of organization design
and program integration in field management of the Safeguard program.
This distinction becomes one of the sensitive elements used in the
subsequent analyses.
Edward Anthony conceptualizes control in a more practical sense and
his conceptualization provides a mechanism for assistance in "bridging
the gap" between the theoretical foundations of control and the practical
19
aspects of control found in field management of the Safeguard program. 
Although formulated for the purpose of communicating to small business
^^Douglas S. Sherwin, "The Meaning of Control," Dun's Review and 
Modern Industry, LXII (January, 1956), pp. 45-46, 83-84.
^*Ibid.
19
Edward L. Anthony, "Effective Control for Better Management," 
Management Aids for Small Manufacturers, No. 79. (Washington: Small
Business Administration, 1957), pp. 1-4.
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management, this concept of control is easily adaptable to large business
activities, such as the Western Electric Project Organization, and to
government organizations, such as the Safeguard System Command.
Anthony’s concept specifies that control always involves the elements
20
of goal, procedure and checkup. One of these elements, goals, is the
element selected to represent boundary in the operational model. The
other two elements, procedure and checkup, are common to Safeguard
program field management as well as to similar type programs,
Etzioni’s conceptualization of control as being the distribution of
means that an organization uses to obtain the performance it needs and to
measure the actual performance versus the organizations' specification,
21
partially fits the concept of control used in the operational model.
The distribution of means used by an organization to obtain the perform­
ance it needs is too coercive in orientation and is, therefore, not used 
in the operational model. The recognition of control involving the 
measurement of actual performance versus the organization's performance 
specification is germane. This portion of Etzioni's concept of control 
is supportive of the preceding concepts, as well as supportive of the 
composite conceptualization of control developed in Chapter VII.
Control, based on the preceding rationale, meets the three criteria 
for selecting independent variables, thus appropriate for use in repre­
senting conversion in the model.
^°Ibid.
21
Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), Chapters 6 & 7.
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Decision making or cycle regulation are possible concepts for
representing the conversion process of the model but neither meets the 
three criteria for independent variable selection as well as control is 
able to do. This is primarily due to their incompatibility with the 
other operational model variables selected and their uncommonness to the 
Safeguard program and to similar programs without significant definitional 
change.
Decision making, in the sense of Simon's concern with deciding as
24
an integral part of doing, is a common analytical concept. Although 
common for use as an analytical concept, decision making would be 
difficult to apply to the evaluation of the interrelationship of organi­
zation design and program integration in field management of the Safeguard 
program. It would be difficult to convert from analytical concept to 
substantive condition. It would be even more difficult to restrict to 
only the conversion process of the overall model, as it is a major concern 
in the other operational model variables as well. Using control as concern 
with the events and activities directly related to achievement of major 
purposes and goals of an organization appears to encompass decision 
making as a part of such a concept.
Haberstroh's concept of cycle regulation is another possible 
candidate to represent the conversion process element of the operational 
model. This concept recognizes that most organization task models 
incorporate repetitively performed patterns of activities whose purpose
22
Simon, Administrative Behavior, Chapter 1.
23
Haberstroh, Handbook of Organizations, pp. 1171-1172.
24
Simon, Administrative Behavior.
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25
are the achievement of organizational goals. Each such cycle has a
performance measure associated with it and psychological completeness
for the human element involved, as well as operating at distinctively
26
different levels of organization concern. This concept can be incor­
porated into the general control concept as previously defined. Such 
incorporation is defensible especially in relation to the concern with 
maintenance of the organization so that it can function adequately to 
achieve purposes and goals.
Efficiency is used to represent output in the operational model.
The concept of efficiency that is employed closely parallels the criterion
27
of efficiency originally proposed by Simon. Simon's criterion of
efficiency required "the selection of that alternative, of all those
available to the individual, which will yield the greatest net (money)
28
return to the organization." This concept is most applicable to
commercial organizations, as Simon recognized.
With a small number of changes, this concept becomes susceptible
to application in non-commercial organizations and integrative with the
general concept of control. Simon devoted much effort to transposing
the basic commercial organization applicability of the criterion to non-
29
commercial application. This effort of Simon is not used as the
25
Haberstroh, Handbook of Organizations.
^^ Ibid.
27
C. E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, Measuring Municipal Activities, 
(Chicago, International City Managers' Association, 1938).
^®Ibid.
29
Simon, Administrative Behavior, Chapter 9.
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explanation of the concept of efficiency relative to this model* A 
separate transition from the basic criterion is more applicable, using 
the original commercial orientation as the starting point. Obviously, 
the first change pertains to the net return aspect. Money measures are 
not appropriate for non-commercial organizations, or at least are not 
the primary return measure evaluations. They may not necessarily be the 
most appropriate for some commercial organizations. Western Electric 
Company's emphasis on company prestige and patriotic service to the 
government, at the expense of direct money profit, provides a possible 
illustration of such a situation.
As a substitute for money returns, the concept of efficiency used 
in the operational model uses multiple returns. These multiple returns 
depend on the goals of the organizations involved and the external 
pressures exerted on the organizations that dictate which one, or few, 
of the returns is the most important to the organization. Congressional 
pressures on controlling costs and public pressure pertaining to nuclear 
safety at deployed sites are examples of external pressures on the 
government field management organization that demand flexibility of 
emphasis in the return bases used.
Another necessary change to the basic criterion pertains to the 
alternatives available from which the best alternative is selected. 
Consideration of all possible alternatives, in the selection of the best 
alternative, is not feasible. Whereas Simon's later refinement of the 
criterion of efficiency used satisficing in place of optimizing, the 
concept of efficiency used to represent output in the operational model
30
This situation is analyzed in detail in Chapter V.
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employs the idea of selecting the best alternative from those alternatives 
evolving from the control system. The control system is concerned with 
the efforts directed toward achieving organization goals and maintenance 
of the organization so that is is oriented toward the achievement of such 
goals. From such goal orientations, filteration of alternative possibil­
ities occur. Alternatives that pertain to the achievement of goals and 
maintenance of the organization are illuminated. The concept of efficiency 
used in the model uses these alternatives as the basis for selecting the 
best.
Each of the specified criteria for selecting independent variables 
is met by efficiency. Efficiency, like the other selected independent 
variable, is a common element in field management of the Safeguard program
and in similar programs.
31 32
Compliance or role orientation, among others, are other possible
concepts for use in representing the output element of the operational
model. Neither meets all of the criteria for selection of independent
variables as well as efficiency is able to do.
Compliance, as used by most authors, pertains to a coercive type of
organization-human relationship. Etzioni is illustrative of the coercive
emphasis on compliance. He defines compliance as the relation between
the kind of power used to enforce control and the subordinates attitude 
33
toward that power. Using such a perspective, Etzioni develops a
31
Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, 
(New York; The Free Press, 1961), Chapter 1.
32Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society, (New York: Random
House, 1962), Chapter 1.
33
Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.
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classification of organizations based on the typical pattern of compliance 
of the subordinates to the kind of power used to enforce control.
Although Etzioni integrates compliance with control, especially in 
relation to the organizational control s tructures,the  coercive basis 
of compliance he uses precludes its use in representing the output element 
of the operational model. Even though much of the government field 
management effort involves power based control systems, a significant 
amount of effort does not. Informal, or "ad-hoc," control systems 
evolve outside the official government hierarchical organization design 
without the use of coercive power. The same is true for a portion of the 
industry efforts. Even though the government development and production 
contract for the Safeguard program contains voluminous specifications 
and requirements, the scope and complexity of the program and its control 
requirements defy contractual coverage of all possible, or even probable, 
needs. Although not contractually covered, these pertinent government- 
industry control needs are usually given attention through informal, non- 
direct power based, means.
Communications is the concept selected to represent the feedback 
element of the operational model. The basic Shannon model of communica­
tions is the foundation upon which communications, as a representation of
35
feedback is the system model, is based. This model uses four basic 
elements. The first element is the sender, or that person or event that 
produces a message and inserts it into the communications system of the
^^Amitai Etzioni, "Organizational Control Structure," in Handbook of 
Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 
1965), pp. 650-677.
35C. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communications 
(Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1949).
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organization* The second element is the channel; or the method of 
conveyance of the message between the sender and the receiver. The 
receiver is the third element of the communications system, either as 
the intended recipient of the message or an accidental recipient as the 
result of diffusion from the channel. Noise, or anything in the channel 
other than the message wanted by the sender, is the fourth element of 
the communications system.
This general model of communications provides a sound theoretical 
base for feedback as well as transition to the applied context of 
Safeguard program field management and the interrelationship of organi­
zation design and program integration. The communications network that 
represents the combination of the four elements of the general model into 
a working model, enables a differentation to be made between particular 
communications systems. If the communications network is aligned to the 
formal organization structure, the hierarchical chain of command or a 
legitimized source of power, it is considered as a formal communications 
system. If it does not meet either of these criteria, it is considered 
as an informal communications system. The existence and significance 
of formal communications systems in either the government or industry 
field management organizations, or between them, is one of the sensitive 
considerations in the subsequent analyses.
Due to one of the major functions of feedback in a system model 
being that of providing the means of internal regulation of the entire 
model, when the model is viewed in a dynamic sense, communications offers 
a good conceptual variable representation. Communications, in the four 
element context previously outlined, provides for the means of regulating.
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either by overt instigation or conditioned response, the composite of 
the total operational model.
Dyanmics (i.e., growth and development)^^ or a s s e s s m e n t , a s  well 
as other concepts are possible candidates to represent the feedback element 
of the operational model. They are unable to meet the previously speci­
fied criteria for selecting independent variables as well as couunuulcations 
is able to do.
Starbuck's conception of organization growth and development, or 
dynamics, is not conducive as a representational framework for feedback, 
due to the constraining nature of the definitions of growth and develop­
ment used in the concept. Growth is viewed by Starbuck as change in
size relative to membership in the organization and development as change
38
relative to an organization's age. Neither of these definitions would 
be responsive in an environment of frequent organization activations, 
expansions, contractions and de-activations resulting from use of systems 
and project management concepts, such as those used in the Safeguard 
program. The dynamics of government organizations associated with defense 
weapon programs and industry organizations supporting such programs, far 
exceed such sterile and moot definitions.
Goals is the independent variable selected to represent boundry in 
the operational model. Initial consideration of such ideas as mission,
William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development," in 
Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rank McNally
& Company, 1965), pp. 451-533.
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James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, (New York: McGraw-
Hill Company, 1967), Chapter 7.
38
Starbuck, Handbook of Organizations.
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function, products, projects, etc., as boundary representational concepts, 
resulted in a decision that a broad definition of goals would encompass 
all such ideas.
Goals will be defined as the composite organization's operational 
objectives. They are composite in the sense of being acceptable as 
operational objectives of both the organization itself and the members 
of the organization. They are operational in the sense of reflecting 
attainable ends of the organization and its members. Deployment of a 
specified weapon configuration by a certain date is considered as an 
operational objective for government, whereas the defense of the United 
States against enemy launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is 
not. The attainment and retention of a specified percentage of profit 
on a certain annual dollar amount is an operational objective of industry, 
whereas the attainment of maximum profit is not.
Goals, as the operational objectives of the composite organization, 
provides a partially identifiable surface around the program and organi­
zations involved in the analyses. It is also permeable to the extent 
that external environmental influences are received and responded to.
The operational objectives of the Safeguard System Command and the Western 
Electric Project Organization provides the enclosing sphere within which 
field management of the program is accomplished and within which the 
interrelationship of organization design and program integration must be 
viewed and analyzed. The enclosing nature of the operational objectives 
provides a boundary within which the operational model must operate and 
upon which external environmental influences must be identified, evaluated 
and included or rejected in the operational model assessment.
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To make the operational model completely open in nature, it would 
be necessary to take into account the influences of all possible environ­
ments in which the system exists. This would not be feasible, therefore, 
a quasi-open system concept is used. The general environments of govern­
ment, industry and the overall Safeguard program are recognized and 
considered. The remainder of the environmental possibilities are 
generally excluded.
Influences of the government, industry and overall Safeguard program 
environments are significant. This is the result of the specific 
influences each has on field management, as well as on the other opera­
tional model variables and on the model as a conceptual entity.
The governmental environment influences the model by such consider­
ations as:
1. A standardized approach to organization design possibilities 
available in structuring field management organizations is used. This 
results from the government emphasis on using similar organization design 
structures among the many defense weapon programs. Such an emphasis on 
likeness of organization designs means that the organization design for 
management of a complex missile system must fit, generally, an organization 
design used for management of an armored vehicle or infantry support 
weapon. Fitting of unlike programs to similar organization designs 
contributes to the problem of integration of complex programs.
2. Government adherence to an official human resources rank 
and grade structure within the Safeguard field management organizations 
exists. The rank structure of the military personnel and the grade 
structure of the civilian personnel involved in field management
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illustrates this situation. Such a rank and grade structure inhibits 
the araont of flexibility available in field management.
3. A high degree of sensitivity to pressure external to 
the program structure exists. Examples such as the particular national 
administration. Congress and political pressure groups are illustrative 
of this situation.
The industry environment influences the model in such areas as:
1. Difference in goal emphasis of the industry sector as 
compared with the government sector. Industry's emphasis is aligned to 
the Safeguard program as one of numerous commercial and defense programs 
of the Western Electric Company whereas the government's emphasis is 
aligned to the Safeguard program as the basic program the Safeguard 
System Command is responsible for.
2. Difference in industry perspective resulting from the 
supplier, or dependent, nature of industry as compared with the customer, 
or independent, nature of government. This is reflected in the contractual 
arrangement between government and industry that is used to obtain 
industry program participation.
3. The mandatory nature of Western Electric Company "Company 
Instructions" used for common subject areas in the Safeguard program and 
throughout the company results in standardizing of program integration 
approaches and techniques. These "Company Instructions" impose stereotyped 
methods and techniques in relation to how things are done irregardless of 
the particular program or situation.
The overall Safeguard program environment influences the model in 
such areas as:
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1. Change in the international political arena and the 
system's place in that arena. If the international political environment 
is oriented to arms expansion, the Safeguard program is heavily emphasized. 
Conversely, if the international political environment is oriented to
arms limitation, the program receives less emphasis. The current 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is illustrative of this program 
influence.
2. Significance of the program in the overall national defense 
posture. If there are alternative weapon systems available to accomplish 
the purpose of the subject system, the importance of the one system is 
reduced. In the case of the Safeguard program, no other ballistic missile 
defense system is near the point of deployment; therefore. Safeguard must 
be considered in the context of being the only system available for 
ballistic missile defense. This increases the critical dependence upon 
the program and reduces the competitive balance attainable from multiple 
programs.
Rationale for Model 
The operational model is obviously general in nature and macro in 
orientation, thus an explanation of the rationale of its development and 
its pertinence to the subject at hand appears appropriate. Why is a 
composite macro model necessary when many micro models already exist 
and single concept macro models abound? What use can be made of such a 
composite macro model and what should it not be used for? Who would use 
such a model and who would not? What is the relationship between the 
model developed and the subsequent detailed analyses that are also
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conceptual elements of the macro model? What is the bases upon which 
the model is constructed and what degree of validity should be expected 
frcm its use? What is the purpose and use of the subsequent individual 
conceptual sub-models? What is the relationship between the model developed 
and the assessment of the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of the Safeguard program? Answers 
to these questions are the purposes of this section.
The question of why a composite macro model has to be constructed 
appears answerable in relation to the following considerations;
1. Most of the existing macro models are based on use of one 
conceptual representation. The objective of this study is to determine 
the interrelationship of organization design and program integration in 
field management of the Safeguard program. The concept of program 
integration, in itself, represents a multi-concept perspective. To 
assess it in relation to organization design necessitates use of multi­
concepts synthesized into a composite mechanism for use in evaluation.
A composite macro model appears to provide such a mechanism.
2. Although many micro models exist that adequately pertain
to specific concerns addressed in this study, the use of micro considerations 
is segmenting in orientation. With the concept of program integration 
important to the subject under study and basically synthesizing in its 
orientation, use of micro models would detract from the broad integration 
emphasis of the perspective desired.
3. Many of the existing macro models are based on the 
assessment of a single agency program. Obviously, the Safeguard program 
and its field management is not a single agency program. Chapters II
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and III illustrate the multi-agency nature of the program and the 
sensitivity of integration of the many agencies to achieve effective 
program field management.
The operational model is intended for use by top levels of management 
in both government and industry to provide a perspective for viewing the 
complexities and ramifications of large complex programs. It should 
provide such top level managers with a perspective that insures the composite 
integration of many diverse concepts that such programs must contend with.
It should provide a reference framework within which more concrete macro 
models can be assessed and an infrastructure upon which micro (in the 
sense of functional areas, special sub-programs, etc.) concerns can be 
built and have a reasonable degree of validity in relation to their inter­
dependencies and interrelatedness.
The model is not Intended for the handling of actual data nor for 
the development of sub-models that will handle actual data. Use of the 
model for such purposes negates the integrated conceptual perspective it 
is intended to reflect and moves it from its intended level of conceptual 
abstractness to the level of concreteness associated with micro areas of 
concern.
Such a model should provide program directors, project managers, senior 
staff specialists and similar program management positions with an integrated 
conceptual framework that provides a perspective mechanism for handling the 
multi-facets of many current programs that are large and complex. It is not 
intended as a useable assessment framework for operating middle managers 
responsible for distinct segments of a program. Its conceptual scope 
exceeds that pertinent to such levels of management.
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The operational model is obviously abstract and macro in its 
orientation* The conceptual representations used to portray the model 
elements are also abstract and macro, although to a lesser degree than the 
basic model* The conceptual representations used to represent the 
operational model elements are also models in themselves. They are 
useable not only as elements of the operational model but also as conceptual 
perspectives for the areas of concern they portray* The subsequent analyses 
are based on using the separate conceptual representation models for 
assessing the interrelationship of organization design and program 
integration in field management of the Safeguard program* Although 
individual conceptual representational models are used individually in the 
subsequent analyses, the interrelatedness and interdependency of each in 
relation to each other and to the general operational model is recognized 
and synthesization attempted*
The individual element models should be useable by senior management 
levels responsible for the broad areas of a program represented by the 
concepts* If the program is structured such that the conceptual elements 
of the operational model are not considered to be separate program areas 
in themselves, two alternatives appear available. One alternative would 
be to relate the conceptual areas to the program structure elements, or vice 
versa, to the extent feasible. The second alternative would be for the 
program structure elements to use the perspective of the general 
operational model for the particular program segment they are responsible 
for.
The second alternative appears feasible for both the government and 
industry aspects of Safeguard program field management. Neither government
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nor industry structures their field management program along the lines 
of the operational model conceptual representations. The government 
program structure is aligned to functional areas (research and development, 
procurement and production, site activation and logistical support) 
representing phases in the life cycle of a weapon system. Industry's 
program structure is aligned to product areas (Project Engineering and 
Operations and Site Engineering and Operations) and an integration aspect 
(Project Control and Systems Engineering).
Although neither element structure its program along the lines of 
the concepts used to represent elements in the operational model, both 
appear conducive to use of the operational model and its conceptual 
elements. The conceptual representations of the operational model are 
generally considered to be processes in both the government and industry 
field management schemes. As such, they play important roles in accomp­
lishing the field management program and cross standard program structure 
elements. Crossing of the standard program structure elements reinforces 
the need to assess the field management program from the perspective of 
synthesization necessary to integrate processes and program structure 
elements.
The program structure elements of both government and industry field 
management appear conducive to use of not only the separate conceptual sub­
models but also the general operational model. The functional government 
program areas and the product and integration areas of industry can be 
perceived as sub-programs. From such a perspective, the concepts of 
goals, planning, control, efficiency and communications and their inter­
relatedness appear pertinent to the production aspects of a program or to 
the site engineering and operations aspects of a program.
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In summary, the rationale flow for the model is:
1. Operational model based on conceptual representations as 
model elements.
2. Operational model intended for use by top levels of 
management as an integrative perspective framework.
3. Conceptual element models providing a framework for 
inclusion of concrete micro considerations.
4. Conceptual element models portraying critical processes 
in government and industry field management.
5. Conceptual element models intended for use in assessing 
elements of the operational model or providing a perspective framework 
of less abstractness than the operational model.
6. Neither the operational nor the separate conceptual models 
are susceptible to operation or validation by use of concrete data. All
are intended as conceptual perspective frameworks.
A logical question appears to be what validity can be attached to the
model and to the selection of the conceptual representations used as model 
elements. The preceding section established certain "groundrules" that 
concepts had to meet before they were selected for inclusion in the 
operational model. As noted above, the conceptual representations selected 
represent critical processes in both government and industry field management. 
The use of a semi-open system approach to the operational model dictated 
that certain concepts fit certain elements of the system structure. A
combination of such concerns tempered by the experience of the author 
resulted in the development of the operational model and the selection of 
the conceptual representations used to portray its elements.
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The theoretical nature of the model and its abstractness precludes 
definitive validation. The results derived from the subsequent analyses 
appear to support its general validity for the purposes intended.
Its ultimate test will be its application to similar programs and 
situations and the relevancy of the inferences and indications resulting 
from such applications.
CHAPTER V 
GOALS^
Before assessing the impact of goals on the interrelationship of 
organization design and program integration in Safeguard field management, 
it is necessary to delineate the particular context of goals to be used 
in this analysis. The first delineation must be made between the goals 
of the individual members of an organization and the goals of the organi­
zation itself. This study is primarily concerned with the goals of the 
organization.
Gross's approach to organizational purpose will be used as the
2
basic concept for the assessment of goals. Gross categorizes goals 
relative to satisfaction of clientele interests, output of goods and 
services, performance criteria used, orientation of organizational 
resources investment emphasis, mobilization of organizational resources, 
observance of codes and type of rationality emphasized. Use of such 
categorizations provides a mechanism for assessing the following 
considerations;
^Goals, objectives and purposes are used synonymously in this 
chapter and in all subsequent analyses.
2
Bertran M. Gross, Organizations and Their Managing, (New York: 
The Free Press, 1964), Chapter 11.
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1. The officially stated goals of an organization may not 
match the practical goals of the organization. This appears to be the 
results of operational necessities and the theoretical nature of formally 
stated organization goals.
2. Organizations have a multiplicity of goals and such goals 
are continually changing in priority of emphasis.
3. A conceptual framework is available for use in an evaluative 
scheme of Safeguard field management. From such a framework, operational 
goals can be identified and their relative priority established.
Government-Industry Similarities and Differences 
Identification of program or organization goals within the govern­
ment framework is exceedingly difficult. Goals are not normally defini­
tively stated, nor are they developed specifically as goals, or objectives.
A synthesis of program purpose and organization mission provides the best 
indication of goals that is available in government programs. The purposes 
of a particular program are outlined as a part of the approval process of 
the program. Each organizational element, as part of its organization and 
management scheme, specifies the general mission of the organization and 
of its subelements. The composite of that portion of program purposes 
for which the organization is responsible and the mission of the organi­
zation itself will represent goals in the concept used in this assessment.
The purpose of the Safeguard program and the mission of the Safeguard 
System Manager should provide an indication of the goals of the Safeguard 
System Organization. This composite should be indicative of the Safeguard 
program goals at the policy level as well as for the overall Safeguard 
program.
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The objectives of the initial deployment of the Safeguard system
were outlined in Chapter I. The mission of the Safeguard System Manager
is to develop and assure the timely, effective deployment of the
Safeguard system and to provide a single point of contact within the
Department of the Army for the coordination and direction of all
3
activities pertaining to the Safeguard system. The Safeguard System
Office provides assistance to the System Manager in the exercise of his
4
(System Manager) responsibily. The Safeguard System Evaluation Agency's
mission is to provide a single organization for performing evaluation of
the system, independent of the Safeguard System Command and the Safeguard
5
contractor organization. This independent agency is for the purpose of 
enabling the performance of testing that will support an independent 
evaluation program responsive to user requirements.^ The Safeguard 
System Command is responsible for accomplishing the development, acquisi­
tion and installation of the approved Safeguard system within the guidance 
and direction of the Safeguard System Manager.^
If the preceding objectives are synthesized with the responsibilities 
and missions of the Safeguard System Manager, Safeguard System Office, 
Safeguard System Evaluation Agency and the Safeguard System Command,
3
U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of 
the Army, Safeguard System Master Plan, Volume No. I, "Safeguard Basic 
Objectives," undated.
4
Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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somewhat definitive statements become available in relation to the 
composite goals of the program and organizations involved.
The goals of the Safeguard program have been continually dynamic 
in an operational sense. The formal, or static, goals, as outlined by 
President Nixon's announcement of his decision to deploy the system, 
are stable. The implementation of these static goals by transposition 
to operational goals is an environment of continual change and adjustment. 
This dynamic nature of the operational program objectives is a result 
of numerous factors. Some of the major influencing factors are the annual 
program reassessment, incremental method of program authorization, changes 
to the threat base, continual change in the state of technology used in 
system equipment development and continual need to adjust the projected 
system costs.
Annual program reassessment requires a program to be both a total 
program and an open-option for subsequent program changes. It is a 
total program in the sense of becoming an operating system entity as a 
result of each annual reassessment. The program approved as a result of 
the annual reassessment has to be considered as a possible final system 
program. Annual reassessments require that the prior approved program 
retain an open-option capability so that changes resulting from subsequent 
reassessments can be incorporated into the overall program with minimized 
impact on costs, schedules, performance, contractual arrangements and 
organizational resources needs.
Incremental program authorization and the attendant appropriations 
process prohibits comprehensive alignment to the theoretical total program 
needs. Contractual arrangements with industry must be structured in such
89
a manner that approved program requirements are procured in consonance 
with program authorization received as well as approved and anticipated 
program needs. Such a paradoxical situation precludes use of optimizing 
approaches to contracting, planning, organizational resources utilization 
and similar concerns.
The threat base against which the system is designed is also dynamic. 
As the ballistic missile threat changes, certain aspects of the system 
equipment configuration, equipment design criteria and deployment method­
ology must also be changed. These changes must be integrated into both 
the currently approved program and the projected total program.
The Safeguard system requires a level of technology that uses the 
most m o d e m  "state-of-the-art” available. As theoretical and applied 
research develops new technological advancements, the system must be 
adjusted to consider the use of such new technology. Any application 
requires program adjustment for inclusion.
Actual and projected program costs play a major role in the 
operational objectives of the field management organizations as a result 
of the high cost of the Safeguard program and previous experience with 
defense weapon system cost escalation. This situation is further 
compounded by the current overall government emphasis on economy and 
austerity in relation to defense programs.
The development and production lead-times of the system equipment 
and the advance nature of the technology involved contributes to the 
difficulty of accurately estimating program costs. Due to the complexity 
of the equipment involved and the advanced nature of technology employed, 
a high degree of concurrency exists in relation to the development and
production aspects of the program. Major pieces of equipment cannot be 
designed and tested before they are released for production of the 
equipment necessary to achieve a deployed defense site by the time 
required. The length of time necessary to develop major equipment sub­
systems coupled with the time necessary to produce such equipment is 
excessive in relation to the need for such equipment to combat a known 
or anticipated threat.
To alleviate the excessive timeframe that would result from sequen­
tial phasing of development and production, a system of concurrent effort 
is employed. This concurrent process involves the development of pieces 
of equipment and their subsequent release to production. Such an 
incremental method results in a segmented orientation to both the 
development and production programs. Integration emphasis occurs only 
when the incremental pieces of equipment are shipped to the tactical 
site for final installation and test.
Incremental program authorizations normally specify a maximum 
funding figure and a definitive system configuration. Both the policy 
and field management levels of government and industry must be concerned 
with providing the specified system configuration within the program 
funding limitation imposed. The reconciliation of these two boundaries 
necessitates "trade-offs” that require a dynamic perspective relative to 
program and organization objectives, or goals.
The goals of the government field management program and organization 
can only be arrived at by use of the same circular type of deductive 
reasoning as that used for the overall Safeguard program. The purposes 
of the overall Safeguard program pertains to government field management
goals within the limitations imposed by the assignment of program
g
responsibilities to the Safeguard System Command. The mission of this 
Command, as previously noted, is to accomplish the development, acquisition 
and installation of the approved Safeguard system. This responsibility 
is to be carried out through operating (functional) directorates, with
9
support and services provided by Command staff offices.
Operationally susceptible government field management goals, as 
well as program goals, can be arrived at only through deductive factoring 
and interpretation of operational activities.
Industry's goals in relation to the Safeguard program and its field 
management also have to be identified by less than direct means. One 
method is to identify what industry feels its program responsibilities 
to be, identify what the government, as customer, feels industry's 
responsibilities are and then synthesize the two viewpoints into a 
composite perspective. This method is employed in the identification of 
industry operational goals. Western Electric Company's company wide goals 
are assumed to be standard business goals unrelated to the Safeguard 
program and, therefore, are not of direct concern to this study.
The government's views of industry's field management responsibilities 
in the Safeguard program are:^^
g
U. S., Department of the Army, General Order 48, November 15, 1968, 
as amended by Department of the Army, General Order 18, March 15, 1969.
9.
Safeguard Managers' Meeting, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 
February 17-18, 1970.
^°Ibid.
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1. Western Electric Company, as weapon system prime contractor 
for production, installation and test, has responsibility for system 
integrity for all system elements produced.
2, Bell Telephone Laboratories, as principal design agency, 
is responsible for overall system design and control of subcontractor 
design efforts.
Industry views its responsibilities in field management of the 
Safeguard program to be;^^
1. During the research and development phase:
a. Western Electric Project Organization monitoring 
of the system design for tactical application and the providing of 
engineering services, installation and test engineering support.
b. Bell Telephone Laboratories providing the threat 
analysis, definition of system concept, development of system design 
and project control of subcontractor design agencies,
2. During the production and deployment phase:
a. Western Electric Project Organization providing 
program and system analysis, systems engineering and integration, overall 
technical direction and project control of the production, installation 
and test activities performed by Western Electric Company and its 
subcontractors,
b. Bell Telephone Laboratories to provide design and 
documentation control, engineering support and technical assistance.
Purposes, responsibilities, missions and views, such as those 
reflected in preceding paragraphs for both government and industry, are
^^Western Electric Company, Presentation at the Safeguard Executive 
Review Board Meeting, "System Analysis and Program Integration," May, 1969.
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not conducive to assessment, in an operational sense, of the inter­
relationship of organization design and program integration in field 
management of the Safeguard program. To operationalize the goals of 
the government and industry field management organizations necessitates 
the interpretative deduction of operational, or applied, activities. The 
interpretative deductions must use the generalized previous statements 
of purpose, missions and responsibilities as a reference framework for 
their formulation. Gross’s categorization of organization goals, or 
purposes, provides a reference framework for use in the subsequent 
analyses.
Figure 15 illustrates an analytical scheme from which similarities 
and differences in goveimment and industry field management organization 
goals can be deduced. The goals reflected are not the officially stated 
goals of the industry and government organizations but are representative 
of the operational goals actually pursued by the two field management 
organizations. The goals shown encompass the more significant operational 
objectives identifiable from program purposes and organizational missions.
Bases for the satisfaction of interests, in terms of the orientation 
of interests to major groups or pressures, is multiple based for both 
government and industry. Some of the bases for the satisfaction of 
interests are similar, while others differ. Program pride and prestige 
is one basis for the satisfaction of interests that is common to both 
organizations.
At the field management level, program pride and prestige is 
reflected in the disassociation, basically, of the Safeguard System 
Command from the other Army missile system management organizations in
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the Huntsville, Alabama, area. Redstone Arsenal is a large Department of 
the Army installation contigious to Huntsville. The Army Missile Command 
and the Army Missile and Munitions Center and School are both physically 
located on Redstone Arsenal. The first is a field element of the Army 
Material Command and the latter is a field element of the Continental 
Army Command. The Safeguard System Command is physically located in a 
leased, privately owned, complex in the Huntsville Research Park area.
The Safeguard Logistics Command; the Huntsville Division, Corps of 
Engineers; and the Huntsville Office, Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense 
Agency, are also located in the leased complex and not on Redstone 
Arsenal itself.
A similar location situation is evolving from the Western Electric 
Project Organization. At the present time it occupies portions of two 
buildings in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina, whose basic purpose 
is to house the Western Electric Company, North Carolina Works. A new 
building is under construction in the Greensboro area that will be fully 
dedicated to housing the Western Electric Company Safeguard program 
elements.
The actual segregation of the Safeguard program field management 
elements from the other Army missile elements in the Huntsville area and 
the planned segregation of the industry Safeguard program elements in the 
Greensboro area are indicative of the prestige the program enjoys in both 
the government and industry sectors. Program prestige is further 
illustrated by the "hand-picked” nature of most of the employees of both 
the government and industry field management organizations. The govern­
ment personnel are selected on the basis of either their prior association
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with the evolutionary anti-ballistic missile development programs, their 
association with other defense weapon program management organizations 
or with industrial concerns aligned to industry support of complex 
defense weapon programs.
Industry field management personnel are selected on the bais of 
either their prior association with the Western Electric Company efforts 
on anti-ballistic missile development programs or selectively chosen 
from Western Electric Company commercial programs. Due to the vast 
increase in the commitment of new personnel resulting from the decision 
to deploy the Safeguard system, a large segment of their (industry’s) 
Safeguard program organization is staffed with personnel who have commercial 
program backgrounds. Western Electric Company’s philosophy used in manage­
ment of defense weapon programs is based primarily on the use of existing 
Western Electric Company personnel and not mass recruitment from the 
aerospace-military sector as many defense weapon program contractors do.
External group satisfaction is another illustration of the multiple 
based satisfaction of interests exhibited by the two organizations and is 
also illustrative of a satisfaction of interests alignment that is 
different between the two organizations. The Western Electric Company, 
as the parent corporation, and the major program subcontractors denote 
the type of external groups that must be satisfied in the Western Electric 
Project Organization goals array. Western Electric Company has certain 
company wide interests, such as conservative levels of profit and retention 
of the company's image of itself of performing a public service when it 
engages in industry support of defense weapon programs. These company 
wide interests must be satisfied in field management of the Safeguard 
program.
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With the industry program subcontractors being industrial concerns 
such as Raytheon, General Electric, Martin and McDonnell-Douglas, it is 
obvious that the Western Electric Project Organization must insure a 
level of efficiency in its industry integration activities that is 
aligned to the stature and experience of such participating companies.
Each of the major subcontractors either is, or was, the prime contractor 
for one or more major defense weapon programs. With such experience, 
their expectations of the Western Electric Company's management achievement 
for the Safeguard program works as a catalyst to the Western Electric 
Company. The major subcontractor situation is further complicated by the 
subcontractors inability, formally, to deal directly with the government 
field management organizations. The prime-subcontract arrangement for the 
program requires a legal channel of government— Western Electric Company—  
subcontractor and the reverse.
The output of services or goods category of organizational goals 
reflects a partial similarity between the two organizations, i.e., 
government alignment to program accomplishment and industry to satisfaction 
of customer requirements. There are distinct differences in other output 
of goods and services orientations. For example, a secondary orientation 
of government is to organizational survival, or self-preservation. This 
is a neutral, protective type of orientation that appears prevalent in 
most organizations.
The organizational survival orientation of the government field 
management organization is seen in the creation and retention of efforts 
whose basic purpose is support of the organization and not of program 
requirements and needs. Such an orientation is considered normal when
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it is based on one program, or mission, as in the case of the government 
field management organization.
A secondary industry orientation is to company prestige, a more 
positive type of orientation. Western Electric Company has an image of 
itself as a stable, conservative example of traditional American industry. 
Such a self image influences its methods and the ways in which it inter­
faces with the government. The company openly expresses a belief that 
it is performing a patriotic service to the government by performing the 
prime contractor role in the Safeguard program.
The performance criteria category of goals reflects a basic 
difference between the government and industry field management organi­
zations. The government performance criteria is based on program 
accomplishment, as would be expected when the sole purpose of the 
organization is to accomplish a specific program. The performance 
criteria of efficiency is a valid consideration in government field 
management, but is applicable only as it relates to support of program 
accomplishment. An emphasis on program accomplishment as the basic cri­
teria of efficiency contributes to a basic purpose, but precludes use 
of dynamic and innovative approaches. Such an emphasis results in 
saturation type applications and the use of commonly accepted techniques.
Industry’s performance criteria is based on public image retention 
and conservative profit making, which are distinctively different than 
the government emphasis on program accomplishment. An industry perform­
ance criteria based on profitability is expected. If it is secondary, 
as is the case of Western Electric Company in the Safeguard program, it 
is somewhat unique. Maintenance of the company’s perception of its
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public image is clearly more important to the Western Electric Company 
relative to the Safeguard program than that of open profits.
The company program outlook is one of providing a service to the
government by functioning as the prime contractor for the system. This
service is perceived by the company to be above that expected of normal
industry performance as a prime contractor. The company's desire to
retain and protect their historically developed perception of their public
image results in a repression of the open and aggressive profit emphasis
12
normally expected of an industrial concern. This is illustrated by 
their hesitance in participating in profit oriented program ventures that 
are normal to defense programs. Incentive contracting is an example of 
such hesitance. Such a contracting approach is based on company profits 
being dependent upon performance in relation to incentives specified.
The company's non-direct emphasis on profits appears to be reflected 
in their insistence on using approaches, such as continual cost-plus-fixed- 
fee contracting, that can be accomplished within the appearance of providing 
unselfish services to the government and at the same time also insuring a 
continuous conservative level of profit for the company. This contracting 
approach is based on company profit being aligned to a fixed fee for all 
program costs.
The goal category of investment in organizational viability, or 
resources, also reflects a basic difference between the government and 
industry field management organizations. The government emphasis on use 
of a philosophy of minimization of dedicated resources commitment, both
12
This is similar to the survival minimum used by Peter F. Drucker, 
"Business Objectives and Survival Needs," Journal of Business, XXXI (April, 
1958), pp. 81-90.
100
personnel and organizational elements, can be contrasted with industry's 
emphasis on organizational expansion and maximization of dedicated organi­
zational resources investment. The government minimization emphasis 
results from the previously discussed program concept of minimum conmitment 
of dedicated organizational resources and maximum use of existing organi­
zational resources.
Industry's emphasis on organizational resources investment is heavily 
aligned toward expansion. Organizational expansion and maximization 
support the performance cirteria of public image retention and conserva­
tive profitability. This is the result of increasing commitment of 
organizational resources and expansion of the organization design 
structure contributing to the ability of the company to better perform 
customer and program requirements. This supports the self-image of 
efficiency and public service. At the same time it supports a low- 
keyed emphasis on profits that results from use of such profit approaches 
as cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting. Expansion and maximization of organ­
izational resources broadens the cost base upon which the fixed-fee of 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting is based and, subsequently, the prob­
ability of increased profit.
Throughout the other goal categories can be found similarities, 
although they are only of a partial nature. The category of mobilization 
of organizational resources for inputs is partially different between 
the two field organizations. This is due to the government resources 
base being basically controlled by external forces, such as program 
priority, Congressional appropriations and technological feasibility. 
Industry's resources base is controlled by customer (government)
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allocations through the mechanism of a contractual arrangement. This does 
not preclude the probability of industry pressures being exerted relative 
to the government allocation of externally controlled resources. Western 
Electric Company, as well as the other major program subcontractors, has 
an active and efficient lobby in relation to the Safeguard program.
The category of observance of codes reflects a stringent type of 
emphasis for both the government and industry field management organizations. 
The bases of the stringent code observance is different for the two organi­
zations. The government code stringency is based on standard government 
performance criteria, such as regulations, procedures and reports.
Industry's code stringency is based on company criteria, such as Company 
Instructions. Due to the length of the basic anti-ballistic missile 
development effort, from which the Safeguard program evolved, and the 
situation of Western Electric Company being the primary industry partici­
pant throughout the long evolutionary system development process, 
differences in bases of code stringency do not result in major points of 
contention between the two field management organizations.
The emphasis of both government and industry rationality is 
technically, rather than administratively, oriented. Such a rationale 
emphasis results in administration of field management that primarily 
gives support to the technical system rather than administrative efficiency. 
Both the government and industry field management organizations place strong 
emphasis on recruitment of personnel with technical backgrounds to fill 
the sensitive position of the organizations. This results in filling 
major administrative and management positions with technically oriented 
personnel and, thus, much of the administrative and management emphasis
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is directed toward technical aspects of the program. Integration of the 
non-technlcal with the technical aspects of the program Is complicated 
by this technical orientation of key management personnel.
Interrelationship Implications 
To Identify the Interrelationship Implications Involved In assess­
ment of goals, It Is necessary to accept certain situations that exist.
The preceding discussion appears to Indicate sensitive considerations 
pertaining to the Interrelationship of organization design and program 
Integration.
The government performance criteria are based on program accomplish­
ment and there exists an organizational survival emphasis In government 
field management. There Is also a commitment to minimize dedicated 
organizational resources. With such situational combinations, government 
field management Is faced with the dilemma of having maximum emphasis 
placed on program accomplishment yet concurrently minimizing organizational 
resources to accomplish the management and administration of the program. 
Maximization of program accomplishment requires a concurrent maximization 
of program Integration to Insure that the many pieces become the composite 
whole of the program. To achieve maximum program Integration necessitates 
a commitment of maximization of dedicated organizational resources, or 
capabilities used, so that the basic commitment of program accomplishment
can be achieved. Government field management emphasis seems to be
13
directly In opposition to this guideline.
13
See Chapter II for detailed discussion of the government commit­
ment to the philosophy of minimization of dedicated organizational 
resources In Safeguard program management.
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The industry performance criteria have been identified as maint­
enance of the company's perception of its public image, an indirect 
profit orientation, an expansion type of organization design tendency 
and a maximized dedicated organizational resources emphasis. Program 
integration is of less significance to industry field management than 
it is to government field management due to industry's orientation 
toward maximum use of dedicated organizational resources. Minimization 
of dedicated organizational resources increases the importance of program 
integration whereas maximization of these resources decreased its import­
ance. Figure 16 illustrates a consensual set of interrelationship 
implications resulting from goals assessment in Safeguard field manage­
ment.
Summary
The operational goals of the government field management 
organization appear to be program accomplishment (operationalized by 
conversion to specific program requirements and external pressures), 
organizational self-preservation and satisfactory response to external 
pressures (administration. Congress, public, etc.). The operational 
goals of the industry field management organization seem to be the 
retention of Western Electric Company's perception of its own public 
image, a conservative level of profits and satisfaction of customer 
(government) requirements so that the first two objectives are enhanced. 
Both field management organizations share the objective, or goal, of 
program pride and prestige.
SIGNIFICANCE IN MANAGEMENT SCHEME
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CHAPTER VI
PLANNING
As indicated in Chapter IV, the principal function of an
organization is envisioned to be the conversion of resources into
goods and services,^ Within such a context, planning can be considered
to be the input mechanism for the organizational system.
Planning is used in the sense of being the programmed process of
decision making within the organizations primarily involved in the
field management of the program. This view of planning is similar to
the rational choice based, ends-means scheme of planning envisioned by 
2
Banfield. Such a view excludes much of the standardized planning 
pertaining to defense programs and to the Western Electric Company.
It includes only the programmed decision making process associated, 
directly, with the fulfillment of the identified goals of the Safeguard 
program field management organizations. It is, therefore, restricted to 
those aspects of planning that are pertinent to the interrelationship 
of organization design and program integration.
^H. Igor Ansoff, "Planning as a Practical Management Tool," 
Financial Executive, XXXII (June, 1964), pp. 34-37.
2
Edward C. Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning," in Concepts 
and Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. by Sidney Malick and 
Edward Van Ness (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962),
pp. 70-80.
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The planning process in Safeguard field management is based on
3
both the standard Army planning system and a Safeguard program peculiar 
system of formal planning. The program peculiar system is the Safeguard 
System Master Plan.
The standard Army planning system is based on long-range, mid-range 
and short-range planning structures. The Basic Army Strategic Estimate 
is the basic guidance upon which all other Army planning activities are 
based. It describes national policy and the objectives to be accomplished 
and is a statement of the defense concept projected approximately twenty 
years into the future. The Army Strategic Plan is oriented toward 
determining the Army objectives for executing the strategic concept out­
lined in the Basic Army Strategic Estimate for the long-range portion of 
that plan. The Army Force Development Plan is a detailed analysis of the 
Army force structure with emphasis on the short-range portion of the 
Basic Army Strategic Estimate. These types of plans can be summarized 
as the strategic portion of the formal Army planning system.
Concurrent with and supportive of the strategic formal planning 
activities of the Army is the programming process. The purposes of 
planning are to outline requirements to implement the strategic conepts 
specified in long-range projections, establish the actions necessary to 
show the optimum application of resources, assess and evaluate the risks 
involved in the application of resources and identify imbalances or 
deficiencies involved. Programming's purpose is to translate the 
guidance derived from plans into programs which outline the application 
of resources required to implement the plans.
3
U. S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation 1-1, "The Army 
Planning System," (Washington: The Adjutant General, 1969).
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The Five Year Defense Program specifies the Army's arrangements 
for meeting the objectives outlined in the strategic plans. A corollary 
to the Five Year Defense Program is the Financial Program. This program 
specifies the funding resources required to implement the objectives 
outlined in the Five Year Defense Program.
The Army Materiel Plan specifies, in detail, the equipment and 
services required for Army needs. This includes both those to be 
provided internally by the Army and externally through commercial 
purchase. A separate section of the Army Materiel Plan pertains to each 
defense weapon program and details the equipment, services, funding 
and organizational resources required to accomplish the program. This 
plan specifies such information for the current fiscal year and for five 
subsequent fiscal years. The Army Materiel Plan can be considered 
either as the lowest level of the strategic portion of Array planning or 
the highest level of the operational portion of Array planning.
The Safeguard System Master Plan encompasses all aspects of the 
Safeguard program that are conducive to coverage by a formal plan or 
procedure. It includes the overall organization structure for the program, 
assignment of tasks to non-Safeguard System Organization elements, inter­
relationships and interfaces involved in government management of the 
program, plans for routinization of special activities and other similar 
areas susceptible to formalized coverage.
The Safeguard System Master Plan provides a mechanism for incor­
poration of all major formal plans and planning activities into one 
"umbrella" planning structure that is, by direction, applicable to all 
government program participants. Many of the separate segments of the
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Safeguard System Master Plan are incorporated into the government-industry 
production and deployment contract as legal contractual requirements.
The major portion of the standard Army planning system and parts of 
the Safeguard System Master Plan pertain to what is subsequently referred 
to as strategic, or formal, planning. It is considered to be formal 
planning due to emphasis being placed on those aspects of planning that 
can be clearly identified and projected well in advance of current 
operations. In contrast, operational planning pertains to those "day-to- 
day" plans that relate to the achievement of mandatory operating tasks, 
solution of existing or eminent problems and the analysis and evaluation 
of actual performance.
Government-Industry Similarities and Differences
In contrast to a recognizable difference in goals of the government 
and industry field management organizations, planning significance is 
basically similar for both organizations. Both emphasize the importance 
of planning to organizational and program effectiveness. The emphasis 
is heavily oriented to what has previously been identified as formal 
planning. Neither organization places heavy emphasis on the implementation 
of the myriad of formal plans that are developed nor the necessity of 
assuring the interrelationships and interdependencies of the many formal 
plans. This situation is the result of much of the formal planning require­
ments emanating from higher levels of government and industry. It is also 
reinforced by the non-relatedness of most of the formal plans to the processes 
involved in accomplishing the field management aspects of the program.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Contract DAHC60-68-C-0017, "Safeguard 
Production Contract," 1969 and 1970.
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Both of the field management organizations emphasize planning from 
the standpoint of continuation of existing planning requirements and activ­
ities, data accumulation to be used for status evaluation and presentation, 
and response to externally imposed planning requirements. Examples of such 
externally imposed planning requirements can be found in the Cost Informa­
tion Report (CIR), Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), and Contract Fund Status 
Report (CFSR) systems that require formal planning against which progress is 
reported.
The planning activities pertaining to the product assurance (i.e., 
quality, reliability, maintainability and test) aspects of the program 
illustrates both the centralized, hierarchical nature of government field 
management formal planning and the "ad-hoc" nature of operational planning.
Each functional directorate of the Safeguard System Command has a separate 
product assurance element as a part of its organization design. The Command 
itself has a product assurance staff office. A formal product assurance plan 
exists as well as implementing, or supporting, formal plans for specific areas.
In contrast to the many formal product assurance plans that have been 
developed, critical subelements of product assurance, such as test of 
production items, quality and reliability during the production process 
and reliability testing of "stock-piled" equipment, have little operational 
planning emphasis. The product assurance planning emphasis is oriented 
to formal aspects. The operational aspects are left to those necessary 
to respond to external pressures and current problem areas.
The industry planning process (both from the formal and operational 
aspects) is the result of response to the following stimuli:
1. Customer (government) imposed requirements. These 
requirements are those legally specified in the government contract with
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industry. The customer imposed requirements are aligned to coverage of 
areas susceptible to industry support of government planning activities. 
The government's use of a philosophy of minimized commitment of dedicated 
organizational resources requires dependence on industry field management 
for planning support in certain areas. An example of such government 
dependence upon industry for planning support is in the area of cost 
estimating. The basic cost data base for the program depends upon 
budgetary and engineering estimates of cost that are prepared by industry 
and analyzed by the government.
2, Prime contractor (lead industry manager) needs. These 
needs are based upon operational requirements that are mandatory for 
performance of the prime contractor functions. They pertain to management 
of the subcontractor structure, integration of the overall industry 
program effort and coordination of the many Western Electric Company 
elements participating in the program, A specific example would be the 
planning necessary to schedule and phase equipment between subcontractor 
and Western Electric Company elements. The Missile Borne Guidance 
Equipment is manufactured by the Burlington Shops of Western Electric 
Company and provided to the missile subsystem manufacturers, Martin
and McDonnell-Douglas, for incorporation into the missiles. As the prime 
contractor. Western Electric Company is responsible for planning the 
integration of such requirements,
3, Company imposed requirements. These requirements evolve 
from overall Western Electric Company procedures and policies that are 
applicable to all company elements. They pertain to normal business 
aspects and have no more than indirect applicability to the Safeguard 
Program,
Ill
The government planning process (both from the formal and operational 
aspects) is the result of response to the following stimuli:
1. Externally imposed requirements. The multiple clientele 
of government field management (national administration, Congress, etc.) 
and the response to formal Army planning requirements results in 
numerous externally imposed planning requirements. These requirements 
are aligned to the dictates of external interests and contribute little to
field management needs. They are oriented to needs of outside interests 
and frequently conflict with field management planning needs,
2. Historically accumulated requirements. These are 
continuations of planning efforts that began in earlier days of the 
anti-ballistic missile defense effort and have continued into the 
present. They also have little relevancy to current operational program 
needs.
3. Lead government field management organization needs.
These needs represent the operational planning necessities that are 
required to insure functioning of the composite government field manage­
ment structure. They pertain to the coordination of the many government 
program participants, government interface with the industry field 
management structure and internal operations of the Safeguard System 
Command.
Due to the concurrency of the Safeguard program, the incremental 
method of program authorization that results from the annual Executive 
and Congressional reassessments of the program and the sequential nature 
of the technology involved, the formal planning process is not as 
critical to the program as operational planning. This is not to imply
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that the formal planning process has no significance to the program; 
rather it is to suggest that the formal planning process is far less 
significant than the operational. The formal planning process does 
provide the reference framework within which the operational planning 
process operates.
During the lengthy period of time involved in development of the 
anti-ballistic missile system and the long wait for a deployment decision, 
major emphasis was placed on the development of plans and planning pro­
cesses, The anticipatory nature of this period of time resulted in the 
development of plans and planning processes that were, by necessity, 
somewhat static in their perspective. They were largely based on 
speculation as to what would be necessary once a deployment decision 
was made and an operational program initiated. The decision to begin 
deployment of the system necessitated planning processes and plans that 
were responsive to "on-going" operational needs of the program. These 
were not directly evolutionary from the myriad of historical efforts but, 
rather, necessitated a major reorientation of the basic concept of 
planning process and plans to meet operational program needs.
From this historical environment, there remains a strong emphasis 
on formal planning as well as a continuing awareness of the need for more 
relevant operational planning. Maintenance of the emphasis on formal 
planning results in a commitment of significant amounts of organizational 
resources to support that effort. This results in competition for organi­
zation resources between formal and operational planning requirements.
As a result of the government's use of a concept of minimum commitment 
of dedicated organizational resources, this situation is particularly 
relevant to government field management.
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Both the government and industry field management organizations use 
a centralized approach to formal planning. Within the Safeguard System 
Command, the Comptroller and Director of Programs element is responsible 
for providing the focal point for overall field management planning 
activities.^ Within the Western Electric Company Project Organization, 
the Systems Engineering and Project Control element is responsible for 
overall program direction and project control for the industry structure.^ 
This responsibility includes the formal planning function.
The government field management organization utilizes a decentralized 
system for operational planning. This system is aligned to the functional 
concept of management that is employed in their organizational design. 
Industry's field management organization employs a centralized operational 
planning approach. This system is basically similar to that employed 
by industry for formal planning. The use of a system of maximized 
commitment of dedicated organizational resources by industry allows 
centralized development of plans and control of operational planning. The 
government's use of a philosophy of minimized commitment of organizational 
resources precludes such centralized control.
Industry's centralization emphasis is further supported by specified 
customer planning requirements and industry's centralized customer 
direction acceptance and response system. The customer direction 
acceptance and response system is based on one element of the industry
^U. S., Department of the Army, Safeguard System Command, SAFSCOM 
Regulation 10-1, "Organization and Management Manual," November 19, 1969.
^Western Electric Company, Presentation at the Safeguard Executive 
Review Board Meeting, "Systems Analysis and Program Integration," May, 
1969.
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organization design structure receiving all government customer directions 
and one element providing all official response to such customer requests. 
Figure 17 illustrates the differentation between formal and 
operational planning, as well as the similarities and differences in the 
government and industry planning methodologies.
Interrelationship Implications 
The government emphasis on formal planning impacts program inte­
gration in two different respects. It, first, dilutes the operational 
planning capability that is available where a system of minimized 
dedicated organizational resources commitmen ■ is used. This results from 
the competition between formal and operational planning for the scarce 
planning resources available to the organization. Secondly, emphasis 
on formal planning emphasizes that aspect of planning least useful to 
program integration. Program integration appears to be highly dependent 
upon operational planning for its input process.
Government alignment to decentralized operational planning results 
from the organization design of its field management being functionally 
based in orientation. The triad of functional directorates used in the 
Safeguard System Command are conducive to centralization of the planning 
process in relation to the functional areas represented but not for 
centralization relative to overall field management of the program. The 
absence of an organization design element in the government field 
management structure with a basic responsibility of synthesizing, denies 
a focal point for emphasis on centralization of operational planning.
The orientation of the Comptroller and Director of Programs element 
toward financial aspects precludes the use of that element as the
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synthesizer of the functionally based operational planning segments. 
Although this is the case, it is the only Safeguard System Command element 
that has an assigned planning coordination responsibility.
Industry's joint emphasis on both formal and operational planning, 
as well as the centralized approach it uses for both, supports program 
integration needs. Program integration is also supported in the industry 
sector by the product based approach to organization design that is 
employed in its field management structure. The organization design that 
results from a product based approach is supportive of both the formal 
and operational planning processes and, subsequently, effective program 
integration. Within the industry field management structure, product 
oriented elements are pronounced. The subsystem oriented subelements of 
the Project Engineering and Operations organization illustrates an equip­
ment based product alignment. Service and support type product alignments 
are identifiable in subelements of the Site Engineering and Operations 
organization.^ Product identification and corresponding organization 
design alignment is not as easily recognizable in the government field 
management structure.
Industry's emphasis on both centralized formal and operational 
planning supports effective program integration through the synthesizing 
influence of the centralization. The support is somewhat diffused as 
a result of industry's centralization emphasis' inability to adequately 
interface with the government operational planning process. This is a 
result of the government decentralized mode of operation. The difficulty
^Western Electric Company identification of Safeguard program 
product groupings is discussed in Chapter III.
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of interfacing the two operational planning processes is illustrative of 
the basic differences in organization design structures of the two 
organizations.
Summary
Planning must be viewed both from formal and operational perspectives. 
Formal planning emphasis is necessary to support planning activities at 
the program policy and national defense levels but does not directly 
contribute to the fulfillment of field management responsibilities. 
Operational planning is that part of planning that directly contributes 
to the effective discharge of field management responsibilities.
Operational planning is an integral part of the basic idea of program 
integration.
The formal planning process used in government field management is 
centralized in orientation. Its operational planning process is 
decentralized along functional lines that correspond, generally, to 
the functional areas of the program that are represented by the three 
functional directorates in the field management organization. The 
formal planning process receives stronger emphasis in government field 
management than does the operational planning process. Both the formal 
and operational planning processes of industry field management are 
centralized in their orientation. This is a result of the synthesizing 
alignment of the industry organization design structure. It is also 
supported by industry's use of a philosophy of maximization of dedicated 
organizational resources commitment to support the Safeguard program.
Decentralization of operational planning is not conducive to support 
of effective program integration. This is the result of the decentralization
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segmenting the operational planning process and requiring an additional 
planning synthesization at some higher program level. Centralized 
orientation of the formal or operational planning processes is not 
supportive of program integration in itself. It is supportive if the 
centralization orientation is compatible in level of orientation used. 
Compatibility in level of orientation assists in interfacing the 
corollary field management organizations at a comparable level. The 
organization design that is employed influences the centralized or 
decentralized orientation and the emphasis to be given. Emphasis on 
formal planning, at the expense of operational planning, appears to be 
detrimental to effective program integration. This is due to the critical 
role operational planning plays in the concept of integration of a program.
CHAPTER VII
CONTROL
Control represents the conversion process of the system and is 
conceptually similar to the Litterer concept of control.^ This concep­
tualization of control is based on the idea of control being a system 
in itself, concerned with the achievement of operational objectives 
and concerned with maintenance of the organization so that is can 
achieve operational objectives. Such a conceptualization of control 
appears to be useable in an analysis of the interrelationship of organi­
zation design and program integration in field management of the 
Safeguard program.
Figure 18 illustrates the composite conceptualization of control 
that will be used. As part of the policy formulation process, goals, 
or attainable operational objectives, are established for the program 
and the organizational elements responsible for administration of the 
program. In the implementation of operational objectives, performance 
criteria are established. Actual performance data is collected and a 
comparison made between the actual performance data and the established 
standards of performance resulting from the performance criteria. This 
operation, or process, is the performance measurement system.
1
Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1964), Chapter 13.
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If the comparison of actual performance with established standards 
reflects an acceptable degree of deviation, the control system continues 
to move through a cyclical flow. If the comparison shows a degree of
deviation that is not acceptable, either of two events occur. If the
unacceptable deviation is viewed as either the result of a poor performance 
measurement system, an absence of emphasis on the significance of perform­
ance measurement in the overall management scheme, or if the unacceptable 
deviation is within the realm of correction by operational organizational 
elements, routine notice of such deviation is provided to the appropriate 
operational organizational element for corrective action. This process 
can be viewed as the routine loop of the control system.
If the unacceptable deviations are viewed as not meeting the
conditions acceptable for reference to operational organizational elements, 
overview notice is provided to the policy formulation process. This 
policy formulation process then refines the original goals, or operational 
objectives. This refinement can be accomplished by either changing the 
goals, changing the priority placed on the different goals or changing 
the control system itself. Each refinement is inserted into the control 
system as an adjustment to the system. This process can be viewed as the 
overview loop of the control system.
Using such a conceptualization of control, it appears that certain 
key considerations are involved. The more significant of these appear 
to be:
1. Conversion of operational objectives to performance criteria 
so that the abstractness of the goals are translated into the practical 
context of achievable objectives is one such consideration. Such
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conversion requires articulate definition and concrete understanding within 
and between the two field management organizations. This process illustrates 
the field management perspective, singularly and jointly, of the program.
It also indicates the type of priority system used relative to the weight 
given to the different program elements and activities for which standards 
of performance are established.
2. Method of comparing actual performance with established 
standards is another key consideration. They way in which the established 
performance criteria is compared with the actual operational performance 
is illustrative of the significance of performance measurement in the 
basic management control scheme.
3. Method of determining whether unacceptable deviations will 
be channeled through the routine loop of the control system to operational 
organizational elements or through the overview loop of the control system 
to policy elements appears to be a significant consideration. This consid­
eration is illustrative of whether a macro or micro perspective is used for 
control system assessments. If use of the routine loop is emphasized, 
micro perspective orientation is probable. Conversely, if use of the 
overview loop is emphasized, macro perspective orientation is probable.
4. Another consideration is the length of time allowed for the 
routine loop of the control system to effect corrective action to bring 
performance within acceptable standards before use of the overview loop of 
the control system is invoked. Patience with continued routine loop use is 
probably indicative of a philosophy of exception management and external 
pressure response. Impatience with routine loop actions could imply a broad 
monitoring orientation in the control system. Routine loop patientce could
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Indicate a micro orientation, whereas routine loop impatience indicates a 
macro orientation.
5. Once the overview loop of the control system is employed, 
method used to adjust the control system becomes an important consideration.
The particular method used to adjust the control system suggests the adequacy of 
the original goals identified, the performance criteria selected to implement 
the actual attainment of such identified goals and the significance of the 
control system in the overall scheme used to administer the program.
The concept of control appears to be one of the central elements, 
or focal points, in the total field management scheme. This appears to 
be as it should in relation to this evaluation due to control representing 
the conversion process in the system flow.
Govemment-Industry Similarities and Differences 
From an organization design aspect, the government control system 
reflects both decentralized and centralized tendencies. These are 
similar to the tendencies reflected by the government planning orientation.
The control system is decentralized in the sense of each functional area 
of the organization design having basic responsibility for the control 
system used in its own functional area and being allowed to develop its 
own form of control system. It is centralized in the sense of the 
hierarchical nature of the government field management organization 
design structure specifying a distinct chain of command and a formal 
rank and grade structure. Centralization is also reflected by the 
de facto inheritance of the overall government field management control 
function by the Commanding General and his personal staff. This 
de facto inheritance is a result of the absence of a dedicated element
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in the government field management organization with responsibility for 
performing the overall control function.
This situation is similar to that of program integration in 
government field management. The Comptroller and Director of Programs 
element is the nearest to such a synthesizing control element, although 
its alignment is basically to that of financial considerations. The 
numerous staff offices of the government field management organization 
design structure provide centralized control emphasis for the special 
areas and activities they represent. They do not provide a capability 
of integrating their special areas of interest and the broad functional 
areas of interest into a composite government field management control 
system.
Within the separate functional areas of government field management, 
centralized control is emphasized. The centralized emphasis in the 
functional areas results in a decentralized, or segmented, emphasis at 
the level of composite government field management. Without a common 
synthesizing mechanism, the functional directorate control efforts cannot 
be expected to be aligned to a common emphasis.
Without a synthesizing framework, the operational objectives of the 
functional areas are implemented through development of performance 
criteria that is aligned to the individual functional areas and not to 
the composite program. Actual data is collected to measure performance 
against the criteria established for the functional areas and not 
criteria relevant to the composite program.
Policy formulation, through the means of identifying and emphasizing 
operational objectives, basically occurs in a functional context in
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government field management. Performance criteria are established on 
the basis of functionally oriented operational goals. Due to the 
government's use of a philosophy of minimized commitment of dedicated 
organizational resources, functionally based elements are heavily 
dependent upon the industry field management organization for the develop­
ment of detailed performance criteria and for the collection of actual 
performance data. The small amount of organizational resources available 
to the functional elements of government requires use of industry 
resources for the development of performance criteria and for the 
measurement of actual performance. Such a situation places government 
field management in a dependent position in the control process, although 
the formal contractual arrangement places it in an independent position.
The contracting structure for the program is one of government 
contracts with the Western Electric Company and that company subcontract­
ing with the other major industry participants. Such a contracting 
arrangement contributes to the dependent position of government field 
management in relation to the control process. With government field 
management unable to directly interface with major industry subcontractors, 
it has no choice but to depend upon the Western Electric Project Organi­
zation for operation of the basic industry control system, so far as 
operational program aspects are concerned. Operational control system 
is used herein in the context of the translation of goals into attainable 
objectives, establishing of performance criteria to implement the attain­
ment of such objectives, measurement of actual performance against 
established performance criteria and the assessment of the results of 
such measurements.
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The development of performance criteria is further complicated by
2
many externally imposed, formal performance measurement schemes. Most 
of these externally imposed schemes are aligned to the fulfillment of 
requirements eminating from Congressional and departmental levels and 
have little relevancy to field management needs. The government perform­
ance measurement system is, therefore, one of both responding to externally 
imposed requirements that may, or may not, be pertinent to operational 
field management needs and dependence upon the utilization of that data 
and criteria that industry field management develops and provides to 
the government. These are the bases upon which the government performance 
measurement system is built. With performance measurement occupying 
a sensitive position in relation to the concept of control used, these 
dependencies become important.
With a functionally based alignment in government field management 
organization design and a centralized emphasis on control within separate 
functional areas, the routine loop of the control system is most commonly 
used for correcting unacceptable deviations revealed in measurement of 
performance. The overview loop of the control system is normally only 
used when a "crisis" type situation occurs, or is anticipated.
The industry control system also exhibits certain tendencies toward 
a decentralized alignment. Goals established by the policy formulation 
process are fed to one organizational element. Systems Engineering and 
Project Control, where performance criteria are developed. This 
organizational element does not direct the implementation of the industry
2
U. S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 
No. 7000.2, "Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisition," 1967.
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field management performance measurement system. The implementation is 
accomplished by the other major elements of the organization.
Industry is faced with a segmented situation in its control system 
approach. The conversion of intermediate goals into performance criteria 
is largely based on schedule considerations. This results from the 
Systems Engineering and Project Control element having responsibility 
for the conversion of goals into performance criteria and at the same 
time being schedule oriented in basic outlook. The actual performance 
measurement system is largely based on financial considerations. This 
results from functional elements having responsibility for performance 
measurement and their basic outlook being aligned to technical and 
financial considerations. These diversities create an orientation 
conflict in relation to the industry control system.
With two major segments of the control system, performance criteria 
development and performance measurement, assigned to organizational 
elements with different basic orientations, a synthesization of the 
industry control system is near impossible. This segmentation tends to 
make industry's control system unacceptable for use in relation to 
overall industry field management.
Both the government and industry control systems reflect indications 
of decentralization. They do so for distinctively different reasons.
The government decentralization indication is a result of the functional 
orientation used as the basis of its organization design for field 
management and the absence of an identifiable organization element 
dedicated to integration and synthesis of the control function. The 
industry decentralization indication is the result of a division of the
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control system and process into two segments (performance criteria 
development and performance measurement), each the responsibility of 
organization design elements with different basic interests.
Within specific areas of the Safeguard program, indications of 
both centralized and decentralized control emphasis can be found. An 
example of centralized control of a specific area can be seen in relation 
to the control of equipment documentation (i.e., drawings, specifications, 
etc.). In many defense weapon programs, commercial documentation is 
used to accomplish production and logistic support of the system. The 
concept of documentation used in the Safeguard program is based on use 
of formal government documentation. Such documentation is aligned to 
the preparation and continual updating of equipment documentation to 
meet rigid standards of format and quality. It is released for use 
through a formal system of cataloging, standardization, part number 
assignment and supporting logistic provisioning actions. Changes to the 
documentation must be processed through a similar formal system before 
it officially becomes part of the system documentation.
In contrast, commercial documentation is based on using equipment 
documentation that will support industral production of the equipment, 
industry supplied logistical support of the equipment and the utilization 
of informal documentation evolving from the development effort.
Commercial documentation will not meet the rigid format and quality 
requirements of formal government documentation. It is also not 
controlled by a formal change system as stringently as that used for 
government documentation.
The use of government documentation in lieu of commercial documenta­
tion requires formal release and change mechanisms, slower response to the
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dyanmics of a program that has a high degree of concurrency between develop­
ment and production, more investment in organizational resources to operate 
the system and generally greater cost. This results from the formalization 
and proceduralization associated with government documentation control.
Control of commercial documentation is accomplished in an informal manner and 
is oriented to the rapid adjustments dictated by a dynamic program similar 
to that found in a concurrent program.
An example of decentralized control in a specific area can be seen 
through the example of system schedule control. The basic plan for deployment 
of the system specified certain critical dates that must be met in relation to 
the overall program and to the activation of specific sites. These critical 
dates are implemented through a system of milestones that are similar to net­
work approaches such as the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT).
The milestones are developed by the responsible government implementing organi­
zations, in conjunction with their industry corollary organizations, and sub­
mitted to the Safeguard System Office for synthesization, approval and 
subsequent control. This milestone system operates on an automated basis and 
is not strongly emphasized in operational program efforts.
A standard Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) system 
exists in both government and industry field management. Neither organization 
places heavy emphasis on its use for control purposes. Government field 
management appears to use it to support a general milestone system that 
inputs the basic schedule control system and industry appears to employ 
it only to fulfill a requirement specified in its contract with the 
government.
Both the government and industry field management organizations 
depend heavily on the Safeguard System Work Breakdown Structure as
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3
the reference framework for their control systems. The work breakdown 
structure lists, in a pyramidical arrangement, all hardware (equipment), 
services and efforts required for accomplishing the production and 
deployment programs. The structural alignment of the work breakdown 
structure is used as a basis for performance measurement and as the 
mechanism for contractual arrangements between the government and 
industry.
The government-industry contract for production and deployment of 
the Safeguard system uses the work breakdown structure as the basis for 
specifying the equipment and services that are to be provided by 
industry. Due to the concurrent nature of the development and production 
portions of the program, equipment subsystems are the highest level of 
the work breakdown structure that are purchased from industry as a 
separate entity. The purchase of a complete subsystem at one time does 
not normally occur. Normal government purchase of equipment is aligned 
to third, fourth and lower levels of the work breakdown structure. 
Services are also procured using the structural generation alignment of 
the work breakdown structure.
Performance measurement is generally accomplished through alignment 
to the equipment and services specified in the contract. Desired per­
formance in the areas of cost, schedule, quality, reliability and 
technical performance are specified in relation to the equipment and 
services specified in the contract. Industry field management reports 
progress against the criteria specified for the specific contractual 
items of equipment and services. Government field management measures
3
U, S., Department of the Army, Safeguard System Command, Technical 
Specification 715-9, "Sentinel Work Breakdown Structure," December, 1968.
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performance by comparison of the cost, schedule, quality, reliability
and technical performance criteria contractually specified against
progress reported by industry.
Use of this type of performance measurement system results in the
measurement of performance against contractual requirements and not in
relation to the composite field management program, nor to a major
functional segment of the program. The contract requirement method
appears to be conducive to segmentation of the control process.
The concept of configuration management is also used to provide a
reference framework for both the government and industry field management
control systems. The objectives of the configuration management program
are to establish definitive baselines for schedule, cost, hardware
configuration and manpower in the production and deployment programs;
to stringently control changes to these baselines to insure that all
direct and indirect impacts of such changes are assessed; and to maintain
a current record of the exact configuration and status of the approved
4
system and program. Detailed inclusion of this configuration management 
control system has been incorporated into the government administration 
plan^ and into the production and deployment contracts.^
Configuration management normally is only applicable to the equip­
ment aspects of defense weapon programs. The Safeguard program expansion
4
U. S., Department of the Army, Safeguard System Command, "Concepts 
of Management," (draft) 1970.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Sentinel System Master Plan, Part 
No. 3.10, Annex A, "Sentinel Defense System Configuration Management, 
Operating System Manual," 1969.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Contract DAHC60-68-C-0017, "Safeguard 
Production Contract," 1968, 1969 and 1970.
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of the concept to include cost, schedule and manpower considerations is 
somewhat of an innovative approach to program management as well as a 
recognition of the interrelationship and interdependency of cost, schedule, 
manpower and equipment considerations. The broadening of this concept in 
the Safeguard program necessitates the establishment and control of not 
only an equipment baseline, but also baselines for cost, schedule and 
manpower. The development of definitive cost, schedule and manpower 
baselines is a difficult effort due to the dynamics of the program, its 
uniqueness in relation to experience of other defense weapon programs 
and the large number of government and industry program participants.
Many of the program participants are aligned to different techniques of 
cost, schedule and manpower control, therefore, the integration of 
comparable baselines becomes difficult.
Interrelationship Implications
Indications of the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of the Safeguard program seem 
to be apparent in the control process. Development of performance 
criteria, through conversion of goals into operational objectives and 
the implementation of such operational objectives, is influenced by the 
functionally based design structure of government field management.
This alignment of the government's organization design structure results 
in functionally oriented performance cirteria. This forces the overall 
control system in the direction of a functional alignment itself and 
impedes overall control of the field management program.
The decision whether the routine or overview loop of the control 
system is to be used when unacceptable deviations occur in measurement
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of performance is influenced by organization design. The particular 
design structure basis used appears to divert the unacceptable deviation 
to whatever control system loop is compatible with the organization 
design philosophy used. A functionally based organization design 
structure normally diverts the unacceptable deviation information to 
the routine loop corresponding to the appropriate functional area. To 
the functional area, the loop may be seen as overview oriented but to the 
overall control system it is seen as a routine loop. A product based 
organization design structure normally diverts unacceptable deviation 
information to the control loop that corresponds to the product area.
To the product area the loop also represents an overview orientation but 
to the overall field management effort it represents a routine loop.
An overview loop can be perceived only in relation to the composite 
field management efforts of either government or industry field manage­
ment, or both.
Program integration also seems to influence the control system 
loop decision in relation to the emphasis placed on program integration 
determining the importance of performance measurement in the overall 
scheme. If program integration is considered to be important to the 
overall management scheme, performance measurement should be recognized 
as important. Accordingly, the routine-overview loop choice should 
be of major significance. On the other hand, if program integration 
is not considered to be important to the general scheme of management, 
neither performance measurement nor the routine-overview loop decision 
should be of major importance.
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Time allowed in the routine loop of the control system before the 
overview loop is used, appears to be influenced by both organization 
design and program integration. This influence is due, primarily to 
the same perturbations as those used in relation to the initial routine- 
overview loop decision.
The method used to revise operational objectives, performance 
measurement and performance criteria in the overview loop of the control 
system seems to be influenced by program integration. If program 
integration is emphasized in the general scheme of management, revision 
of operational objectives generally appear to be oriented to:
1. Change of priority in performance criteria to increase 
program integration emphasis. Existing performance criteria will be 
revised or new performance criteria developed that are aligned to the 
achievement of the desired program integration emphasis.
2. Stimulation of performance measurement system to force 
use of the routine loop of the control system to accomplish the same 
results as those attainable from use of the overview loop of the control 
system. In essence, the overall control system becomes aligned to the 
composite program to the extent that the routine and overview loops 
become the same. The synthesis of the routine and overview loops of 
the control system is indicative of the synthesizing nature of the 
concept of program integration.
Figure 19 summarizes what appears to be the generalized organization 
design-program integration interrelationship implications of control that 
are significant in relation to field management of the Safeguard program.
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Summary
Control is at the very heart of the concept of program integration.
It appears to be that segment of the system around which the other 
system elements revolve. It functions as both the conversion process 
of the system and as an operative system in itself. Conversion of goals 
into attainable objectives, development of performance criteria to 
measure the objectives identified, collection of actual performance data, 
comparison of actual performance data with desired performance standards 
and corrective actions required to bring actual performance to desired 
performance standards seem to be the more significant elements of the 
concept of control and also of the operational control system.
The government control system is primarily decentralized in basic 
orientation. This is heavily influenced by the decentralizing nature 
of the functionally based government field management organization 
design structure and the absence of an organizational element with an 
overall synthesizing responsibility for control, or for program integration. 
Some centralized tendencies are exhibited in the government field manage­
ment control system. Examples of these are the assumption of the 
synthesizing control function by the hierarchical apex of the government 
field management organization and specific control systems established 
for special program needs.
Industry's control system seems to be centralized in basic 
orientation. This could be assumed to be the result of the existence 
of a dedicated organization design element in the industry structure 
for composite control emphasis and for overall program integration.
The dependent nature of industry in relation to the contractual
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arrangement with the government also forces industry's control system 
towards a centralized alignment. There are indications of segmenting 
tendencies in the industry control system as a result of the development 
of performance criteria and the measurement of actual performance being 
performed by different organizational elements, each with a different 
basic orientation. Segmenting of these two processes has a decentra­
lizing influence on the industry field management control system.
CHAPTER VIII
EFFICIENCY
The preceding analyses have identified the differences in output
orientation of the government and industry field management organizations.
With such differences, a common measurement framework for output is
necessary. The concept of efficiency, in the sense of satisficing
2
and not optimizing, provides a measurement framework that is conducive 
to encompassing both government and industry output orientations.
Simon's original criterion of efficiency demanded that alternatives 
be selected, from all the possible alternatives available, that would
3
result in the largest return from the amount of resources used. Such 
a conceptualization of efficiency is too stringent for use in assessment 
of system output relative to the interrelationship of organization design 
and program integration in field management of the Safeguard program.
The use of satisficing alternatives, in lieu of optimal alternatives, 
provides the conceptual flexibility necessary.
The operational model (Chapter IV) based the selection of alter­
natives to be considered in the selection of the best (satisficing)
^James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1958).
2
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (new York: The
MacmiIlian Company, 1961), Chapter 9.
^Ibid.
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alternative on those emanating from the control system. This method 
of filtering the possible alternatives is based on operational considera­
tions, Simon’s refinement of alternative considerations from optimum to
4
satisficing is based on theoretical considerations.
Efficiency, as an output conceptualization, provides a reference 
framework for the assessment of output but does not provide a basis 
for direct output comparison. It provides only a bases of approximate 
comparison. Such approximate comparisons can be seen in subsequent 
examples and illustrations of output efficiency orientations,
Govemment-Industry Similarities and Differences 
The measurement of system output, or efficiency, in government 
field management reflects multiple clienteles and diverse pressures 
resulting from such multiple clienteles. It also reflects the commit­
ment of government field management to the primary objective of program 
accomplishment. The commitment of the basic objective of program 
accomplishment reflects little consideration of efficiency in relation 
to balanced effectiveness.
The multiple clientele of government spans the spectrum of govern­
ment and private interests. Within the government sector, interests and 
pressures are exerted by both the legislative and executive branches. 
Interests and pressures from the legislative branch can be seen by such 
illustrations as:
1, House Appropriations Committee interests in overall program 
costs and the dispersion of long-range program costs so that a satisficing
4
March and Simon, Organizations,
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arrangement can be made between Safeguard program costs and the overall 
defense and government needs and available resources.
2. Senate and House Armed Services Ccxnmittees interests in 
the relationship of Safeguard system capabilities, schedules and costs 
to the desired overall national defense posture.
3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee interests in the 
relationship of the Safeguard program to the international political 
arena and to the world nuclear balance. Safeguard influence in the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is a current example of such 
influences.
4. Senate and House Government Operations Committees 
interests in the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of the 
Safeguard program.
5. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy interests in the 
Safeguard program in relation to the nuclear capability of the system.
Interests and pressures from the Executive Branch of government 
can be illustrated by:
1. Department of Defense interests in the Safeguard program. 
These interests are based on such considerations as overall respon­
sibility for the program resting with the Department of Defense, 
evaluation and adjustment of the program in relation to other defense 
weapon programs and Joint Chiefs of Staff interests in the overall 
national defense posture.
2. Department of the Army has interests that are based on 
it having executive responsibility for implementation of the Safeguard 
program. The competitive atmosphere that exists within the Department
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of Defense relative to weapon programs of the different services is 
also apparent.
3, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the 
President, interests in the analyses of estimated program costs, 
integration of program costs into the composite national system of 
priorities and economic capabilities, and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the management of the program.
Private sector interests and pressures can be seen in such 
examples as:
1. Private business interests in participating in the 
manufacture of system equipment and in the providing of program services. 
Government programs relating to small business, labor surplus areas
and economically depressed areas force their inclusion in program 
considerations.
2. Public interests relating to the location of nuclear 
components of the system and the methods planned for assuring nuclear 
safety. Pressures resulting from public nuclear safety concerns were 
evident in the previous Sentinel program's plan to deploy interceptor 
missiles with nuclear warhead capability in metropolitan areas. Such 
plans received strongly vocal rejection by much of the public in 
affected areas.
3. Local area interests in the physical location of deployed 
sites from the standpoint of both positive and negative economic impacts. 
Deployment of a site results in an influx of new residents, both military 
and civilian, to the local area and the use of local residents for 
certain aspects of site activation. Deployment of a site also entails
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needs for additional educational facilities, housing and recreational 
opportunities, as well as other services areas.
Each of the many diverse interests and pressures express desires 
and objections. Such desires and objections must be analyzed, evaluated 
in relation to the overall program and resolved by either acceptance, 
rejection or compromise. Many of the diverse interests and pressures 
require large amounts of information for their deliberative process.
The necessary information must be developed and provided with an 
assumption that continuing efforts and actions will be necessary by 
the field management organizations. The majority of the information 
required and the actions desired in relation to such pressures pertain 
to the level of program field management.
The preceding examples illustrate the diversity involved in align­
ment of output from the system. The system output must be arranged so
that it has multiple satisfaction capabilities for the satisfaction of
multiple clienteles.
With the multiple clienteles of government field management and 
the resultant diversity of pressures, it would be expected that efficiency 
values of government field management output would also be diverse in 
orientation and non-susceptible to comparison in an absolute sense.
This appears to be the case.
From such an environment, numerous output efficiency measurement
schemes have evolved. Due to the scope and diversity of such schemes, 
it is not feasible to consider all of the techniques and approaches 
used. Four examples (review and analysis, internal review, cost 
analysis and contractor performance evaluation) suffice to illustrate
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the breadth and diversity involved in such assessments. These examples 
are also illustrative of the specificity exhibited by a majority of the 
government efficiency concerns and techniques.
The government field management review and analysis program has 
the objectives of improving management by:^
1. Using review and analysis as a source of evaluated 
management information in the process of decision making.
2. Incorporating review and analysis into all management
and data systems in such a manner that it can be used in planning, 
organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling government field 
management operations.
3. Evaluating actual performance against the overall program 
and mission, with performance efficiency evaluated in both qualitative
and quantitative terms, and alternatives provided to permit managers
a range of choices available for decision making.
Although the government review and analysis program is intended as 
a comprehensive coverage of output efficiency, it appears that its 
orientation is heavily aligned to an information system or decision 
making type of application. It does not encompass the breadth of 
perspective necessary to satisfy the concept of program integration.
The second example of government output efficiency approaches 
is that of internal review. The objectives of the internal review pro­
gram are to support correction of deficiencies revealed by examination 
and inspection actions, perform a preventative function in areas of a
^U. S., Department of the Array, Safeguard System Command, "Concepts 
of Management," (draft), 1970.
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sensitive nature, provide coordination and liaison with official external 
audit agencies, monitor followup actions taken to correct deficiencies 
noted in examination or inspection actions, aid in the assessment of 
internal controls used to determine efficiency and effectiveness, and 
insure adequacy of procedures used to develop internal controls and 
audit trails.^ This program is characterized by procedural interest, 
retrospective observations and financial orientation. It, also, does 
not encompass the breadth of perspective required for the concept of 
program integration.
The government cost analysis program has the objectives of 
improving the analysis of all major program costs in order to aid in 
obtaining realistic requirements, the selection of the most effective 
system for a given expenditure, as support to contract negotiations by 
providing reliable assessment of resources required in a contractor's 
estimate and the assessment of the total resource implication involved 
in alternatives considered in the decision process.^ This program is 
also financially oriented in its alignment and narrower in perspective 
than that necessary for the concept of program integration.
A final example of government output efficiency assessment approach 
is that of the contractor performance evaluation program. While the 
first three examples pertained, primarily, to the assessment of output 
efficiency relative to government efforts, this program is primarily 
concerned with government's assessment of industry's output efficiency.
^U. S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 37-10, 
"Internal Review" (Washington: The Adjutant General, 1968).
^U. S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 11-18, 
"Cost Analysis Program" (Washington: The Adjutant General, 1968),
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The objectives of the program are to provide a method of determining 
and recording the effectiveness of contractors in meeting their 
contractual commitments in selected programs and contracts and the 
determination of mutually agreeable performance criteria necessary to
g
measure such contractor performance.
The program involves the preparation of reports on contractor 
performance by government organizations, industry review of the govern­
ment prepared reports relative to the facts involved, resolution of 
any inconsistencies of fact, storage of contractor performance evaluation 
information in a central data bank and the use of such information in
source selection, contract award, profit/fee evaluation and similar
9
government contract activities. Such a program assumes that identifiable 
and clearly understood performance criteria exist. Use of formal contract 
requirements normally are the only areas that are mutually recognized and 
understood by both the government and industry organizations involved.
The contractor performance evaluation program, like the other three 
examples, falls far short of the broad perspective required for program 
integration.
Each of the preceding examples illustrate the diversity of output 
efficiency measurement and assessment involved in administration of the 
Safeguard program, or any other program of similar complexity and scope. 
This could probably be a normal expectation, due to the diversity of 
objectives that exist in field management organizations. The diversity
8
U. s.. Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 715-16, 
"Contractor Performance Evaluation" (Washington: The Adjutant General,
1969).
9
Ibid.
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of external pressures involved and the resultant output efficiency 
values necessary to reflect such diversity also illustrates the need 
for diverse output requirements.
Industry's approach to output efficiency is distinctively different 
than that of government. Industry's approach must be viewed from two 
different aspects; that of efficiency relative to satisfaction of 
customer(government) requirements and that of efficiency relative to 
satisfaction of company interests. The first is largely based on 
the formal contract between the government and industry field management 
organizations. It pertains to that segment of industry effort that the 
contractor performance evaluation program attempts to measure and 
assess. In addition to the contractor performance evaluation program 
requirements, most of the Safeguard program contracts require comprehen­
sive progress reporting by industry for use in government evaluation.
These reports represent another means of government assessment of the 
industry output efficiency and assists industry in evaluation of its 
own output efficiency.
The second aspect of output efficiency in industry field management 
pertains to one of the most sensitive areas of information access in any 
business operations. It involves investigation of what a business concern 
believes its own interests to be. These are interests above those of 
fulfillment of customer requirements and entails information of a highly 
privileged nature. Without free access to such privileged information, 
interpretations must be made from the information available. It appears 
that Western Electric Company's satisfaction of company interests in
10
U. S., Department of the Army, Contract DAHC60-68-C-0017, 
"Safeguard Production Contract," 1968, 1969 and 1970.
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relation to field management of the Safeguard program involves retention 
of the company's perception of its public image, Safeguard program pride 
and prestige and conservative profitability. These are the same 
objectives previously identified for industry in relation to field 
management of the Safeguard program.
The differing output efficiency orientations and values within and 
between the government and industry field management organizations are 
indicative of the necessity of having a reference framework for considera­
tion of composite output efficiency. Program integration provides such a 
reference framework if the organization design structure enables it to 
be used as the relativity system for output efficiency measurement 
and comparison. If the organization design structure is not conducive 
to emphasis of program integration, the development and use of a relative 
comparison framework for output efficiency becomes difficult. The macro 
perspective of program integration and its synthesizing interest pertain 
to such a relative comparison framework for output efficiency.
In the government sector, output efficiency is measured more in 
relation to response to the external pressures of the multiple clientele 
than it is in relation to total program progress. This results from 
government field management's use of a management by exception and response 
to external pressures approach. This situation is further reinforced 
by the use of a philosophy of minimized commitment of dedicated organiza­
tional resources.
The exception and response to external pressures orientation of 
government output efficiency measurement results in varied and differing
^^Chapter V provides a detailed analysis of these goals.
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efficiency ingredients. These range from cost and schedule to quality 
and reliability; each requiring a different unit of measurement and each 
likely to be incompatible with the other output ingredients in an absolute 
comparative sense. The Joint Committee on Atomic Engegy emphasis on 
nuclear safety, the Office of Management and Budget emphasis on automated 
information systems and small business emphasis on manufacturing a 
specific piece of system equipment are illustrative of the diversity of 
output ingredients involved.
Industry's system of output efficiency is measurable in relation 
to customer requirements and company requirements. As the supplier, in 
a customer-supplier relationship, industry must judge its own output, 
and its output is judged by others, relative to satisfaction of customer 
imposed demands. This is different than the government situation wherein 
a myriad of varied output emphasis are required to meet the interests 
andpressures of the diverse clienteles involved.
Western Electric Company's output efficiency orientation is not
directly related to profit standards, as would be expected of an
industrial concern. Its efficiency emphasis is a mixture of retention
of its historically developed perception of the company's public image,
personal program pride resulting from its many years of association
with defense surface-to-air weapon programs and a degree of profit
orientation that is in consonance with support of the other company
12
output orientations. As would be expected, this mixture of output 
emphasis results.in,a varied set of output efficiency values.
12
Chapters II and V discuss the basic foundation upon which the 
Western Electric Company orientation is based.
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Interrelationship Implications
With the government output efficiency criteria based on response 
to external pressures of multiple clientele and with a functionally 
aligned organization design structure, program integration must function 
as the relative reference framework for the determination and assessment 
of output efficiency values. The use of a functional approach for field 
management organization design results in functionally aligned program 
integration and not program integration from the total program overview 
perspective. A functionally based organization design structure, such 
as that employed by the Safeguard System Command, appears to preclude 
use of a synthesizing perspective, unless an organization design element 
is specifically identified as having responsibilities for such a 
synthesizing function. Such a situation results in the output efficiency 
values resulting from the external pressures generated by the multiple 
clientele being relative only to the functional areas reflected in the 
organization design structure or to the external pressure areas. The 
output efficiency values are not relative to the composite field manage­
ment program.
Industry's mixture of output efficiency values, measurable in terms 
of company interests and customer requirements satisfaction, presents an 
even more difficult dilemma than does that of the government situation. 
The differences in government relative output efficiency pertaining to 
the response to pressures of multiple clientele and having a functionally 
based organization design structure are so varied that development and 
maintenance of an overall output efficiency relativity framework is 
recognized as a near impossibility. With industry field management
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output efficiency generally measurable relative to satisfaction of 
customer requirements and company interests, the assumption is usually 
made that such output efficiency values are measurable in relation to 
each other and to some composite. Such is not the case when the output 
efficiency values are based on such diverse interests as satisfaction 
of customer requirements, retention of the company's perception of its 
public image, pride in the Safeguard program and conservative profit 
emphasis. Each of these output efficiency emphasis depends on a 
different value base and are not readily related to each other in any 
absolute sense. They are measurable only in relation to the composite 
perspective of a total program integration framework.
Summary
If defense weapon programs must exist in an atmosphere of response 
to the pressures of multiple clientele, as it appears they must, measure­
ment of the values of their output efficiency must be structured so that 
the variations in values can be related to each other and to a composite 
program whole. Program integration, as the overview perspective, provides 
such a relative measurement framework. Program integration's ability 
to function as the relative measurement framework for output efficiency 
values appears to be dependent upon the structure of the organization 
design. If the organization design is synthesizing in orientation, 
program integration can reasonable be expected to function as the relative 
framework. If it is segmenting in orientation, program integration cannot 
function as such a relative framework.
Government output efficiency is aligned to the satisfaction of 
diverse interests of multiple clientele. The organization design
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structure is segmenting in orientation. This is due to the functional 
basis used. There is no identifiable synthesizing element in its 
organization design structure. Program integration is not aligned to 
the macro perspective of total program field management and, therefore, 
cannot be expected to function as the relative framework for output 
efficiency. It appears that government field management does not have 
a relative framework for output efficiency.
Industry output efficiency is aligned to the satisfaction of 
customer imposed requirements and company interests. Its organization 
design structure is generally synthesizing in orientation. This 
assumption is based on the existence of an organization design element 
that is identified as being responsible for synthesization of industry 
field management efforts. Although not emphasized by industry field 
management, program integration is capable of functioning as the macro 
perspective for it's program field management. It is, therefore, capable 
of functioning as the relative framework for output efficiency. In 
essence, industry field management does not use a relative framework 
for output efficiency but is capable of so doing.
CHAPTER IX
COMMUNICATIONS
Communications is used in the broad sense of distribution, receipt
and exchange of information, data, opinions and concerns. With such a
broad definition, communications appears to reflect the flow of life
and viability within a system, as the concept of system is used in
this study* Barnard felt that communications occupied a central position
in a comprehensive theory of organization because the structure and scope
of the organization depends upon communications,^ Simon supported the
importance of communications because without it there was no influence
2
on decisions of individuals in the administrative process.
Government-Industry Similarities and Differences 
In both the government and industry field management efforts, 
communications, as a concept, is used almost synonymously with manage­
ment information. In defense weapon programs, management information 
is normally considered in the sense of automated information and 
formally reported planning status. The government policies relative
^Chester I, Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge; 
Harvard University Press, 1938),
2
Herbert A, Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1961),
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to management information systems perceive management information to
3
be primarily an automated data processing type of information. Within 
the government sphere of Safeguard program field management, the basic 
management information structure is the Safeguard Management Information 
System.^ This management information system is based on a computerized 
process, using "on-line, real-time" techniques.
The Safeguard Management Information System employs automated 
information bases for such areas as system configuration, technical 
documentation, costs, schedules, manpower and contracts. The information 
bases are continually updated and theoretically represent "real-time" 
information. Management makes use of the information through remote 
access, "on-line," terminals located in all major government field 
management elements.
Although the management information system is based on centralized 
data, immediate access and mutual usage, it contains only that infor­
mation susceptible to automated processing. Quantitative formal 
requirements and reports make up the majority of the information base.
It is not a system for communications, if use is made of the broad 
interpretation of communications previously specified. The system is 
not conducive to the exchange of opinions, ideas and inferences.
Communications is considered in this analysis in a broader sense 
than that used for standard government and industry information
3
U. S., Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 18-1, 
"Management Information System," (Washington: The Adjutant General,
1970).
4
U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of 
the Army, "Safeguard Management Information System," 1968.
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and automated Information systems. Management information and automated 
information systems should be considered only as part of the information 
and data exchange portion of the broad concept of communications that is 
used.
Communications in government field management must be viewed from 
two distinctively different perspectives. These are formal communications 
and informal communications. The hierarchical nature of government 
organizations, especially apparent in military and para-military 
organizations, appears to require a controlled flow of formal communi­
cations as part of the hierarchical relationship structure and as part 
of the organizational survival process.
A hierarchial organization design structure appears to require a 
corollary formal communications system. The formal communications system 
normally corresponds to the hierarchical structure of the organization 
design. If the roles of the organization design structure requires a 
"step-by-step" progression up and down the hierarchy, the corollary 
formal communications system has a tendency to follow the same "step-by- 
step" progression.
The roles resulting from the formal military rank and civilian 
grade structure in government requires such a "step-by-step" progression 
up and down the hierarchy. The formal communications system also appears 
to follow the same pattern. Such a formalized hierarchical alignment of 
the formal communications system orients the information passed through 
to that supportive of the hierarchical structure of the organization 
design. Each level of the hierarchy tends to filter the information 
flowing upward and downward in the formal communications system. The
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control necessary to achieve the desired filtering restricts the kind 
of information and its speed of flow in the system. Government field 
management is faced with the restrictions of the formal communications 
system that result from such a hierarchical filtering of information 
that tends to occur when "step-by-step" progression is used.
As previously noted,^ the organization design used in government 
field management exhibits a tendency toward organizational survival as 
one of its objectives. This organizational survival emphasis competes 
with the basic government field management goal of program accomplishment, 
The organizational survival emphasis requires a controlled flow of 
information through the formal communications system so that the survival 
requirements of the organization can be given appropriate priority in 
relation to other competitive requirements.
The objective of program accomplishment require the free flow of 
voluminous amounts of information. The scope and freedom of flow of 
the information required for program accomplishment is not conducive 
to the controls exerted by the formal communications system. As a 
result of this situation, the informal communications system provides 
the mechanism for the flow of the majority of the information required 
for achieving the program accomplishment objective.
Formal communications is accomplished through an upward and down­
ward flow in the hierarchical pyramid. Due to the dependency relation­
ship of lower members of the hierarchical pyramid in relation to those 
higher in the pyramid and the formal rank and grade (position) structure
goals.
5
See Chapter V for detailed analysis of government field management
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used in government field management, formal communications are generally 
restricted to those that are required by regulations, those considered 
by the lower levels of the hierarchy to be of personal benefit to pass 
upward, those considered by the upper hierarchical echelons to be 
essential for the lower levels to function and those resulting from 
crisis situations.
The emphasis on formality and proceduralization in the physical 
communications process further reinforces the restrictive control of the 
formal communications system. This is the area of government operations 
that earns the stigma of "bureaucratic red-tape." Formal communications 
in government field management requires elaborate coordination efforts, 
higher official approval and formalized processing. The amount of 
effort and time necessary to insert information into the formal 
communications system precludes its use in more than semi-static situations.
The insertion of information by the Safeguard System Command into 
the formal communications system between that command and the Safeguard 
System Manager illustrates the formalization and proceduralization 
involved. Once the originating organization element has determined that 
the substance of the information is correct, coordination is required 
with all other organization design elements having a pertinent interest.
The number of organization elements with which coordination is necessary 
depends upon the subject of the information. As a minimum, the three 
functional directorates, the Comptroller and Director of Programs 
and the Contracts Office must review the information. The number 
of elements with which coordination is necessary may be greater 
if the information is relevant to the Command staff office. Once
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the coordination is completed, the information must be authenticated by 
the signature of either the Commanding General or a designated member 
of his personal staff.
The absence of a government field management organizational element 
responsible for integration requires that such formal coordination and 
authentication be accomplished before information is inserted into the 
formal communications system. The existence of an organizational 
element dedicated to program integration should alleviate much of this type 
of effort and delay in handling information. It should also support 
increased use of the formal communications system.
As a result of the controlled and restrictive nature of the 
government formal communications system, an information system has 
evolved that transmits both informal and formal communications. This 
normally occurs as a parallel to any formal communications system.
The informal communications system serves a distinctively critical 
function for government field management because of the controlled and 
proceduralized nature of its formal communications system. The informal 
communications system is an integral part of the government design 
structure for field management.
The existence of an informal communications system, as well as 
the sensitive part it plays in overall government field management, is 
easily recognizable. An illustration of its existence and sensitive 
position can be seen in relation to personal staffs of key members 
of the government field management organization. Many of these key 
positions encompass a scope and complexity of responsibilities for which
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personal staffs would be beneficial. The organization structure 
excludes legitimized personal staffs at less than the level of the 
Commanding General. To circumvent the absence of legitimate personal 
staffs, informal ones are created. By use of the informal ccanmunications 
system, critical information is passed to selected members of the 
organizational elements. Access to this critical information, in 
conjunction with the ability to return information to the incumbents 
of key positions, allows the key positions to develop informal, 
semi-legitimate personal staffs. The semi-legitimate nature of 
the informal communications system that results from such situations 
further dilutes the effectiveness of the formal communications 
system.
Communications can be viewed more from a composite perspective in 
industry field management than it can in government, although not to 
the point of being able to say that there is only one communications 
system in the Western Electric Project Organization. There are both 
formal and informal communications systems in that organization, but 
the two are more congruent than are those in government field management.
The congruence of the formal and informal communications systems 
in industry field management is a result of multiple factors. One 
contributing factor pertains to the difference in orientation of the 
two organization design structures. The government organization design 
structure is segmenting in alignment and has no element dedicated to 
the integration of the composite program. This necessitates more 
formality in the relationship of the separate organization design elements
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to each other. Industry's organization design structure is more 
synthesizing in alignment and has an element dedicated to integration of 
the composite program. This situation results in less formality in the 
relationship of the organization design elements to each other.
Another contributing factor to the congruence of the formal and 
informal communications systems of industry field management pertains to 
the informality of industry's role structure when compared to the 
government role structure. Industry field management does not have 
as formal a rank and grade structure as that of government. Industry 
does not hesitate to move personnel freely from one position in the 
organization design structure to another. The formal rank and grade 
structure of government field management does not allow the same degree 
of flexibility. The informality of the position role relationship in 
industry field management allows freer use of the formal communications 
system and less dependency on the informal communications system.
The formal communications system in the Western Electric Project 
Organization is stringently controlled and centralized in relation to 
communications with the Safeguard System Command. Much of the infor­
mation exchanged between the Safeguard System Command and the Western 
Electric Project Organization occurs in a formal environment. Informal 
information exchange between the two organizations is not heavily 
emphasized.
From the perspective of industry itself, the stringently controlled 
and formalized communications process used in relation to.information 
exchange with the government field management organization is both 
beneficial and desirable. The customer-supplier relationship invoked
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by government contracting procedures and requirements demands a 
centralized supplier orientation to the government, as customer. The 
use of formalized information exchange supports industry field management 
centralization and control of response to customer requirements. From 
the perspective of overall program benefit and mutual support, such a 
formalized and centralized arrangement between the two organizations 
limits the mutually synthesizing capability of the two organizations.
Interrelationship Implications 
With government field management having a stringently controlled 
and proceduralized formal communications system and a resultant necessity 
of using an informal communications system for much of the information 
required for operational needs, program integration becomes exceedingly 
difficult to achieve. The controlled and proceduralized nature of the 
formal communications system in government field management does not 
provide the amount, kind, or timeliness of information necessary for 
effective program integration. Therefore, program integration must depend 
heavily on information available only through the informal communications 
system. With the informal communications system recognized as a 
necessity, but not legitimized, program integration has to concern itself 
with the sensitivity of the informal communications system information 
it uses. This sensitivity must be assessed in relation to both the 
formal hierarchical organization design structure and the formal rank 
and grade structure.
The achievement of the macro perspective of program integration 
requires access to a comprehensive scope of information that exceeds 
that possible from the controlled and proceduralized formal communications
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system of government field management. The informal communications 
system provides much of the additional information needed for program 
integration but conflicts with the formality and hierarchical arrangement 
of the government organization design structure and the formal rank and 
grade system. The conflict between the informal communications system 
and the hierarchical arrangement of government field management makes 
program integration's use of information from the informal communications 
system dependent upon achievement of an acceptable balance between its 
tendency to intensify the basic conflict and that of obtaining minimal 
program integration needs.
Emphasis on program integration is further complicated by the 
functionally oriented nature of the government organization design for 
field management. The stringently controlled and proceduralized formal 
communications system is segmented along functionally oriented lines 
(research and development, production and logistic support, and site 
activation) and the informal communications systems that arise are also 
functionally aligned. Each informal communications system is generally 
aligned in support of a particular functionally based formal communica­
tions system that corresponds to the functional elements of the organi­
zation design structure. The informal communications systems, therefore, 
are segmenting in orientation and do not provide the comprehensive scope 
of information required for effective program integration. They do not 
provide the synthesizing influence normally expected from an informal 
communications system.
The stringently controlled and centralized nature of the industry- 
govemment formal communications system used for field management restricts
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the flow of information required for the government program integration 
process. Illustrative of these controls is the situation of government 
customer direction to industry and industry's response to customer 
requests. Only a small number of individuals within the government field 
management organization (Safeguard System Command) can provide official 
customer direction to industry field management. Industry requires that 
all government requests for information be directed to one particular 
element of its organization design structure. The information from the 
one specified element of industry's structure is considered as the only 
official Western Electric Project Organization position in its relations 
with government field management. Such formalized and proceduralized 
restrictions appear to greatly impede the flow of information necessary 
for effective program integration. These restrictions also tend to 
reinforce the use of the informal communications systems. This pertains 
to both the internal and interface relationships of the two field 
management organizations.
Summary
Both formal and informal communications systems exist in government 
and industry field management. Use of the formal communications system 
appears to be most pronounced within the government field management 
organization and between the two organizations. The stringency of the 
formal communications system in these two situations necessitates use of 
informal communications systems.
Program integration apparently is dependent upon both the formal 
and informal communications systems for the information it requires.
The controlled and proceduralized nature of the formal communications
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system is not conducive to providing the amount, type and timeliness of 
information necessary. Program integration has to be concerned with the 
sensitivity of the information it uses from the informal communications 
system. This sensitivity must be assessed in relation to the hierarchical 
organization design structure and the formal rank and position systems 
used, especially in government field management.
The functional alignment of the government organization structure 
further segments both the formal and informal communications systems.
It also increases the difficulty of achieving effective program integration. 
The functionally based government organization structure supports the 
evolution of multiple informal communications systems that are generally 
aligned to individual functional areas. The resultant functional align­
ment of the informal communications systems partially dilutes their 
effectiveness by channelling their orientation to specific functional 
areas and not to the comprehensive orientation informal communications 
systems normally have. The absence of a comprehensive informal communi­
cations system in government field management intensifies the significance 
of the segmenting effect of the functionally based organizational 
structure.
Industry's formal and informal communications systems are more 
congruent than are those of government field management. The informal 
communications system in industry field management is more comprehensive 
in scope than the functionally based informal communications system of 
government. Such comprehensiveness of scope provides an integrative 
effect on industry's organization structure and on its overall communi­
cations process.
CHAPTER X
SUMMATION OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Indications of the interrelationship of organization design and 
program integration in field management of the Safeguard program have 
been of paramount concern in the preceding analysis. It is now necessary 
to summarize the interrelationship indications that can be identified as 
a result of the separate analyses and to synthesize such interrelationship 
indications into a Safeguard field management composite. It is also 
necessary that such interrelationships be projected to the level of 
possible applicability to similar situations. The accomplishment of 
these objectives in the purpose of this chapter.
The sensitive aspects of the interrelationship of organization 
design and program integration will be summarized for each of the system 
element analyses. A synthesizing framework will be developed and used as 
the structure for integrating the composite Safeguard program indications 
and for their projection to broader applicability.
Sensitive Aspects of System Elements 
The following indications of organization design and program 
integration interrelationships were suggested as a result of the 
assessment of the concept of goals:
1. If an organization design structure is supporting a program 
that is required to respond to multiple goals, the macro perspective
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of program integration appears necessary to synthesize such multiple 
goals.^ Both the government and industry field management organizations 
have to respond to multiple goals, therefore, a program integration 
perspective appears to be mandatory for both organizations,
2, If the management philosophy employed for an organization 
design structure emphasizes minimized commitment of dedicated organi­
zational resources, the importance of program integration appears to be
2
intensified. If the management philosophy emphasizes maximum commitment
of dedicated organizational resources, program integration's importance
3
appears to be decreased. Government field management emphasizes 
minimized commitment of dedicated organizational resources, therefore, 
program integration's importance can be assumed to be increased. Industry 
field management emphasizes maximized commitment of dedicated organiza­
tional resources, therefore, program integration's importance can be 
assumed to be decreased.
3. The compatbility of organization design structures
between corollary organizations is dependent upon the mutuality of the
4
goals of such organizations. The basic goals of government field 
management have been identified as program accomplishment, organizational 
survival and satisfactory response to pressures of multiple external 
clientele. The basic goals of industry field management have been 
identified as retention of the company's perception of its public image,
^See Chapter V, pages 84-87. 
2
See Chapter V, pages 96-97.
3
See Chapter V, pages 96-97.
4
See Chapter V, pages 96-97.
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Safeguard program pride and prestige, and a conservative level of 
profits. The goals of the two organizations are, therefore, mutually 
incompatible.
4. The structure of an organization design appears to suggest 
the importance of program integration in the overall management philosophy.^ 
If the organization design is synthesizing in structure, program integra­
tion's importance is implied. Conversely, if it is segmenting in 
orientation, it is implied that program integration is of little importance. 
The organization design structure of government field management is seg­
menting in orientation, thus program integration can be assumed to be of 
little importance. Industry field management's organization design 
structure is synthesizing in orientation, therefore, program integration's 
importance is implied.
The following indications of organization design and program 
integration interrelationships were suggested as a result of the analyses 
of planning;
1. Both formal and operational planning systems exist in 
Safeguard program field management. Which of the two is emphasized 
appears to depend upon the importance of program integration in the 
basic management philosophy employed.^ Emphasis on formal planning 
suggests a low degree of importance for program integration, whereas 
emphasis on operational planning suggests a high degree of importance for 
program integration. Government field management emphasizes formal plan­
ning, whereas industry field management emphasizes operational planning.
See Chapter V, page 108.
See Chapter VI, page 111.
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2. Operational planning appears to be a basic element in the 
macro perspective of program integration.^
3. The organization design structure appears to influence 
whether formal or operational planning will be emphasized. If the 
organization design structure is segmenting in orientation, it appears 
that formal planning is normally emphasized. The government organization 
design structure is segmenting in orientation, therefore, it can be 
assumed that formal planning is emphasized. The industry organization 
design structure is synthesizing in orientation, therefore, it can be 
assumed that operational planning is emphasized.
4. The alignment of the formal and operational planning pro­
cess toward a centralized or decentralized mode appears to be contingent 
upon both the organization design structure and the importance of program
g
integration to the general management philosophy. A. synthesizing 
organization design alignment appears to be conducive in use of decentra­
lized modes for both formal and operational planning. Conversely, a 
segpienting organization design alignment appears to be conducive to use 
of centralized modes of planning. The emphasis placed on program 
integration also seems to influence the mode of planning used from the 
same synthesizing-segmenting considerations. Government field management 
has a segmenting orientation of its organization design structure and 
also does not emphasize the importance of program integration. Industry 
field management has a synthesizing orientation in its organization 
design structure. It does not emphasize program integration, although, 
it is capable of so doing.
^See Chapter VI, page 110.
Q
See Chapter VI, pages 110-111.
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The following organization design and program integration inter­
relationships were suggested as a result of the assessment of the 
concept of controls
1. The structure of the organization design seems to influence
9
the choice of performance criteria used to implement organization goals.
A functionally aligned organization design structure normally results in 
performance criteria aligned to support of the functional areas and not 
to the total field management effort. The functionally aligned organi­
zation design structure of government field management results in the 
development of performance criteria aligned to support of the separate 
functional areas represented in the organization design structure. 
Industry's organization design structure is not functionally aligned 
and the performance criteria it develops reflects a basic interest in 
satisfaction of customer interests,
2. The alignment of the control system to a centralized or 
decentralized mode appears to be dependent upon the structure of the 
organization d e s i g n . A  centralized control system should result if 
the organization design is synthesizing in orientation# The synthesizing 
element of the organization design structure appears to provide the 
integrative mechanism for the organization and, therefore, force 
centralized control to be practiced. An organization design structure 
that is segmenting in orientation seems to force emphasis on decentra­
lized control. The absence of an organization design element dedicated
to the integrative function appears to prohibit an emphasis on centralized
9
10
I
See Chapter VII, page 126.
0
See Chapter VII, pages 117-121.
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control. The government organization design structure is segmenting 
in orientation and also emphasizes a decentralized mode for its control 
system. Industry’s organization design structure is synthesizing in 
orientation and its control system emphasis is aligned to a centralized 
mode.
3. The control system appears to be a basic element in the 
macro perspective of program integration.^^ Control provides both the 
operative and regulative mechanisms for program integration.
4. The customer-supplier relationship invoked by government
contracting procedures forces centralized control in the relationship
12
between the two organization design structures involved. The customer 
must articulately specify the legal requirements of the supplier and the 
supplier must specifically respond to such legal requirements. Such 
formality and legality forces centralized control within the two 
organizations in their relations with each other.
The following organization design and program integration inter­
relationships were suggested as a result of the analyses of the concept 
of efficiency:
1. Measurement and comparison of output efficiency is
13
performed in an atmosphere of multiple, diverse interest satisfactions. 
Government field management exhibits a large number of diverse interests 
that must be satisfied by the output of the organization. Industry
^^See Chapter VII, pages 126-128 & 130. 
12
See Chapter VII, page 119.
13
See Chapter VIII, pages 139-141.
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field management exhibits a lesser number of interests but such interests 
are more diverse than are those of government.
2. Output efficiency that is aligned to the satisfaction of
multiple interests appears to require a relative framework within which
14
measurement and comparison can be performed. Program integration 
provides such a relative framework if the organization design structure 
is aligned so that the importance of program integration is emphasized.
The government field management organization design structure does not 
emphasize the importance of program integration, thus a relative framework 
of output efficiency does not exist. Industry's organization design 
structure is aligned such that program integration's importance can be 
emphasized. Although industry does not directly emphasize the importance 
of program integration, it is capable of so doing.
3. The structure of the organization design seems to influ­
ence the priority of the output efficiencies i n v o l v e d . A n  organization 
design structure oriented to synthesis should result in emphasis on out­
put efficiencies that are supportive of the composite program. The 
converse should result if the synthesis orientation is not emphasized.
The government organization design structure is segmenting in orientation. 
Output efficiencies are emphasized that support the separate areas 
represented by the functionally based organization design structure,
the satisfaction of interests of the multiple clientele involved and the 
support of the organizational survival interest. Industry's organization
14
See Chapter VIII, page 141.
^^See Chapter VIII, pages 143-144,
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design structure is generally synthesizing in alignment, thus output 
efficiency is oriented so that the composite program is supported.
The following organization design and program integration inter­
relationships were suggested as a result of the assessment of the concept 
of communications:
1. The extent of use of informal communications systems 
appears to be dependent upon the structure of the organization design.
If the organization design structure is either hierarchically based or 
segmenting in its alignment, use of informal communications systems seems 
to be necessary for the exchange of information required for program 
integration. If the organization design structure is not hierarchically 
based or segmenting in alignment, less use of the informal communications 
system appears to be necessary and there should be more congruence between 
the two. The government organization design structure is hierarchically 
based and segmenting in orientation, thus use of informal communications 
systems appears to be necessary. Industry's organization design structure 
is less hierarchically based than that of government and is also synthe­
sizing in orientation. This indicates less requirement for use of the 
informal coionunications systems and more congruence between the informal 
and formal communications systems.
2. The macro perspective of program integration is dependent 
upon access to varied and voluminous amounts of information.^^ If the 
formal communications system is controlled and procedurealized, the 
informal communications system must function as a source for a large
^^See Chapter IX, pages 149 & 154.
^^See Chapter IX, pages 154-155.
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amount of the needed Information. The government formal communications 
system is stringently controlled and proceduralized, thus the informal 
communications system must be used for much of program integration's 
information needs. Industry's formal communications system is less 
controlled and procedurealized than that of government, thus there is 
less dependence on the information from that system.
3. Use of the informal communications system for program
integration information needs results in conflicts between that system
18
and the formal organization design structure. The hierarchical arrange­
ment of the formal organization design structure appears to depend on 
control of the flow of information. Use of the informal communications 
system circumvents such control. This conflicting situation is 
especially recognizable in government field management.
4. The structure of the organization design appears to
influence the orientation of both the formal and informal communications 
19
systems. If the organization design structure is synthesizing in 
alignment, both formal and informal communications systems should exhibit 
synthesizing tendencies in their structure. Conversely, if the organi­
zation design structure is segmenting in alignment, both communications 
systems should exhibit segmenting tendencies. The government organiza­
tion design structure is segmenting in orientation and as a result both 
its formal and informal communications systems esdiibit functional align­
ments that are segmenting in emphasis. Industry's organization design
18
See Chapter IX, page 155.
19
See Chapter IX, page 157.
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structure is synthesizing in orientation and the results are both its 
formal and informal communications systems exhibiting an integrative 
alignment.
The organization design and program integration interrelationship 
indications identified in the preceding section are by no means the 
only indications of such interrelationships. They represent only those 
indications that appear particularly relevant to a composite organization 
design and program integration interrelationship and those more prevalent 
in field management of the Safeguard program
Theoretical Hypothesis
Before attempting to synthesize the interrelationship indications 
of organization design and program integration, it appears necessary 
to develop a theoretical construct of what such interrelationships 
possibly should be. Figure 20 reflects such a theoretical construct.
The basic elements of the construct are management philosophy, organi­
zation investment emphasis, structure of organization design, importance 
of program integration and methodology of program integration. The 
basic purpose of the construct is to determine a general flow, or casual 
chain, of events in a logical condition of organization design and program 
integration interrelationship.
Due to the large number of sensitive aspects suggested as a result 
of the separate analyses, some synthesizing mechanism is required. Such 
a mechanism must be capable of incorporating the large number of diverse 
indications of interrelationship that are involved. To accomplish this 
necessitates movement to a higher level of generality than that of the
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individual system element analyses. The purpose of the theoretical 
hypothesis is to provide such a mechanism.
The basic elements used in the theoretical hypothesis were selected 
on the basis of their generality, apparent relevancy to the many inter­
relationship indications and their conduciveness to translation into 
subsequent hypotheses used. Each basic element of the theoretical 
hypothesis represents a summation of numerous interrelationship indications. 
Each element is generally understood as an area of consideration in both 
government and industry field management.
Management philosophy represents the initiation of the casual flow 
process due to its ability to portray a mechanism for achieving goals. 
Management philosophy generally determines the organizational investment 
emphasis that is employed. It also determines the structure of the 
organization design used, although the structure is constrained by the 
organizational investment emphasis. It would be nearly impossible to 
use an organization design structure that required maximization of organi­
zation resources investment when the management philosophy dictated a 
minimization of organizational resources investment.
The structure of the organization design determines the importance 
of program integration to the general scheme of management. This does 
not mean that program integration importance is not influenced by 
organizational resources emphasis or the management philosophy used. It 
must stay within the confines of the organizational resources available 
and must be compatible with the general management philosophy employed.
It does mean that the importance of program integration appears to be 
primarily determined by the structure of the organization design. If the
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organization design structure is basically macro oriented, program 
integration should be of less importance than if the structure were micro 
oriented.
Importance of program integration determines the particular program 
integration methodology that will be used. This is not indicative of 
program integration importance being the only determinant of program 
integration methodology; only that it is the primary determinant.
Secondary influence is exerted on program integration methodology by 
the organizational resources investment emphasis that determines the 
resources available to accomplish a particular program integration 
methodology selected.
The theoretical construct cannot be perceived as open-ended. The 
results from the program integration methodology employed will become 
part of the continual reassessment of the management philosophy. Other 
secondary influences also exist in the theoretical flow.
Transitional Hypothesis
A theoretical construct can be considered logically sound but it 
cannot be directly applied to the composite interrelationship of organi­
zation design and program integration in field management of the Safeguard 
program. To consider such a composite interrelationship necessitates use 
of a transitional step. The transitional step must function to operation­
alize the theoretical hypothesis by relating it to the interrelationship 
indications resulting from the previous conceptual analyses. Figure 21 
reflects such a transitional hypothesis.
The identification of goals represents the initiation of the causal 
flow in the transitional sequence. Identification of goals reflects the
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foundation upon which the field management effort is built. The 
performance criteria used to implement the identified goals influences 
the planning orientation by determing whether the formal or the operational 
planning system, or both, will be emphasized as the reference framework 
for the implementation of goals.
Orientation of the planning process (formal, operational, or both) 
influences the significance of control. If the formal planning process 
is emphasized, there is pressure to use the routine loop of the control 
system. Conversely, if the operational planning process is emphasized, 
there is pressure to use the overview loop of the control system.
The importance of control in the general scheme of management 
influences efficiency relativity. The performance criteria used to 
implement the attainment of goals and as the basis for control forces 
use of varied and diverse efficiency outputs. The varied and diverse 
efficiency outputs require a reference framework for use in measuring 
and comparing the relative efficiency of the outputs. Emphasis on use 
of the overview loop of the control system requires an adequate reference 
framework for output efficiency.
Relativity framework for output efficiency influences the purposes 
of communications. If the output efficiency is aligned to performance 
criteria implementing goals of a diverse nature, the formal communications 
system will be emphasized. If a loose relative framework for output 
efficiency is employed, the formal communications system will be used 
to insure that some degree of consensus is reflected. If a stringent 
reference framework for output efficiency is employed, the informal 
communications system will be used.
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Composite Hypothesis 
After consideration of both a theoretical and a transitional 
hypothesis, a final step appears to be necessary. This step is the 
development of a composite hypothesis that can be used to consider the 
applied aspects of the interrelationships identified. Figure 22 portrays 
such a composite hypothesis, combining the theoretical and transitional 
hypotheses previously used. The dotted lines reflect the composite 
groupings of hypotheses stages, assuming the theoretical and transitional 
hypotheses congruent, as they appear to generally be.
Using such a composite hypothesis, certain indications of organi­
zation design and program integration interrelationships appear project- 
able to the level of general applicability. These indications are:
1. Both the organization design structure and the degree of 
program integration emphasis must be aligned to the satisfaction of 
multiple goals. The structure of an organization design, in itself, 
apparently does not determine its ability to satisfy multiple goals.
The organization design structure’s ability to emphasize program 
integration is what influences its ability to satisfy multiple goals. 
Program integration provides the reference framework within which multiple 
goals can be balanced and satisfied in relation to themselves and to a 
composite.
2. The management philosophy that is employed must be 
theoretically capable of being implemented by the organization design 
structure. If the management philosophy is based on minimization of 
dedicated organizational resources, it must also emphasize the importance 
of program integration. Minimal use of dedicated organizational
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resources requires concurrent emphasis on program integration to 
compensate for the absence of such dedicated organizational resources.
If the organization design structure is segmenting in orientation, 
program integration emphasis is not possible. A management philosophy 
based on minimal use of dedicated organizational resources would 
reflect a logical inconsistence and would be almost impossible to 
implement.
3. If the macro perspective of program integration is 
important to the management philosophy employed, operational planning 
should be emphasized. Operational planning provides the adjustment 
mechanism for program integration. The organization design structure 
must also be supportive of operational planning emphasis.
4. Use of the overview loop of the control system must be 
emphasized if the organization design structure is segmenting in 
orientation. The overview loop of the control system provides a 
synthesizing effect and becomes near synonymous with the concept of 
program integration. This assists in negating the segmenting orienta­
tion of the organization design structure.
5. Program integration provides a reference framework for 
output efficiency assessment. If the organization design structure is 
segmenting in orientation, program integration cannot be emphasized 
sufficiently to provide such a reference framework.
6. The informal communications system must be used to provide 
information necessary for program integration if the organization design 
structure stringently controls or proceduralizes the formal communications 
system. Use of the informal communications system for such required
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information alienates the formal organization design structure by 
circumventing its controls,
7. The program integration methodology that is used is 
dependent upon the structure of the organization design. If the organi­
zation design is segmenting in orientation, directed and forced methods 
of program integration are necessary. If it is synthesizing in orienta­
tion, implied and voluntary methods of program integration can be used.
8. Interdependent organizations must give relative emphasis 
to the importance of program integration. Strong emphasis by one and 
weak emphasis by the other dilutes the effectivensss of the emphasis of 
either, or both. The similarities of the organization design structures 
of the interdependent organizations contributes to the probability of 
relative emphasis each gives to program integration.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
The objectives of this study were to determine if organization 
design and program integration were interrelated in field management 
of the Safeguard program; if so, to identify such interrelationships; 
and to project the interrelationships to a level of applicability to 
similar organizations and programs. To address such multiple objectives, 
the conclusion is directed, first, to the identification of the general 
organization design and program integration interrelationships that 
are conducive to general applicability to similar organizations and 
programs. The conclusion, secondly, addresses the interrelationships 
of organization design and program integration that are directly 
applicable to field management of the Safeguard program.
Consideration of interrelationship indications of direct applic­
ability subsequent to consideration of those that appear projectable to 
similar organizations and programs, may appear to put the "cart before 
the horse." The rationale for the sequence is based on the weight given 
to the theoretical basis of the system model used. A theoretical analysis, 
based on the system model and the conceptual representations used, was 
conducted concurrent with the applied analysis illustrated by field 
management of the Safeguard program. Consideration of the interrelationship
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indications that are conducive to general applicability places the results 
of the theoretical analysis "one-step** ahead of the indications deduced 
from field management of the Safeguard program. It also allows the 
interrelationship indications pertaining to the applied aspects of 
Safeguard program field management to be subjected to some form of test.
As a prologue, the conclusion will consider corrective actions 
necessary to balance organization design and program integration in 
field management of the Safeguard program. Implementation necessary to 
effect balanced emphasis will be suggested and based on the minimum 
changes necessary to balance interrelationships of general applic­
ability with those dipgçtly applicable to field management of the 
Safeguard program.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that one objective of 
the study is assumed to have been accomplished. This is the objective 
of determining if organization design and program integration are 
interrelated. The assumption is made that they are strongly inter­
related. The preceding analyses appear to support such an assumption.
Implications of General Applicability
The preceding analyses suggests that the structure of an organ­
ization design is strongly influenced by the organizational resources 
investment philosophy used. If this philosophy is one of maximi­
zation, organization design possibilities are almost unlimited.
If the investment philosophy is one of minimization, the possi­
bilities are limited and the organization design structure must
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be such that the philosophy of minimized organizational resources 
investment is optimized.
The importance of program integration in the general scheme of 
management appears to be strongly influenced by the perspective of the 
organization design structure. Program integration becomes an automatic 
ingredient if it is macro oriented. Program integration is either non­
existent or non-operational if the general scheme of management is micro 
oriented.
Program integration seems to be one of the critical elements in 
implementing the management philosophy selected. Program integration 
plays less than a critical role if the organization resources investment 
philosophy allows the latitude of resources necessary to implement that 
organization design of maximum benefit. Conversely, if the investment 
philosophy restricts the organization design possibilities available, 
program integration plays a critical role in making whatever organization 
design is selected work effectively.
Some element of the organization design structure must be identified 
as that element responsible for the development and retention of the 
macro perspective of program integration is to perform its critical role 
in the overall management philosophy. The element of the organization 
design structure responsible for the macro perspective must be one that 
does not have to dually respond to the macro perspective concern and a 
concurrent responsibility for an area of micro interest. Organization 
design structure elements with responsibilities for both macro and micro 
perspective areas appear to have a tendency to lean toward emphasis of 
the micro areas. This probably is due to the difficulty of performing 
the macro perspective function in relation to the micro functions.
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Operational performance measurement appears to be the control 
system for both organization design structures and program integration 
systems. Performance measurement is the conversion of the program 
and organization goals to operational performance criteria, the subjection 
of that criteria to measurement and evaluation in a relative framework 
and the effecting of corrective actions required to keep the control 
system in balance through time. Performance measurement is, thus, 
the mechanism for the relative comparisons upon which program integration 
depends.
The basic elements of the concept of program integration appear
to be;
1. Goals identified through the process of developing 
performance criteria that can be used in a control system. Goals 
perceived in this manner are automatically operational in nature.
2. Emphasis on operational planning to provide the mechanism 
for continually adjusting the control system in dynamic environments.
3. Control system based on operational performance measurement. 
Operational performance measurement relates the control system to the 
applied context.
4. Relative framework for determining and comparing output 
efficiencies that are aligned to varied and diverse goals. The relative 
framework provides a major segment of the macro perspective of program 
integration.
5. Necessary information flow provided through either a 
formal communications system that is not stringently controlled or 
proceduralized or through an informal communications system that is 
recognized as being semi-legitimate.
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The particular organization design structure used or the degree of 
emphasis given to program integration are suggested as not being of as 
much importance individually as their relative emphasis in relation to 
each other. If a theoretically ideal organization design structure is 
used and program integration importance is not given emphasis, the 
theoretical benefits of the ideal organization design structure cannot 
be realized. If a theoretically maximum emphasis is given to program 
integration in an imbalanced organization design structure, the results 
of such a maximum emphasis will be less than that theoretically possible.
Interdependent organization design structures appear to require 
that the management perspectives of such organizations be mutually 
compatible. If one organization design structure emphasizes one aspect 
of a management philosophy and the corollary organization does not also 
do so to a comparable degree, the results of the emphasis of the one 
organization will be neutralized by the action or inaction of the second 
organization.
In summary, the following propositions of general applicability 
are proposed in relation to the interrelationship of organization 
design and program integration:
1. The organizational resources investment philosophy that 
is employed influences the organization design structure possibilities 
available for use.
2. The particular perspective (macro or micro) that results 
from the organization design structure that is employed effects the 
importance of program integration in the overall management philosophy.
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3. To emphasize the Importance of program integration 
requires a dedicated organization design structure element for develop­
ment and retention of the necessary macro perspective.
4. Performance measurement functions as the control system 
for both the organization design structure and program integration.
5. The basic elements of program integration are goals 
specified through operational performance criteria, operational planning, 
performance measurement functioning as a control system, relative 
framework for output efficiency and a loosely controlled formal or 
semi-legitimate informal communications system.
6. Interdependent organization design structures require 
mutual compatibility of perspectives.
Applied Safeguard Peculiarities
If the suggested propositions of general applicability are assessed 
in relation to their direct application to the Safeguard program, it 
is possible to provide further support of their pertinence by examining 
the applied context from which they evolved. This would also assist 
in transcending the semantics gap between the abstractness of general 
applicability propositions and the concreteness of Safeguard program 
peculiarities.
The influence of organizational resources investment philosophy 
limited the organization design structure possibilities available to 
government field management. It enables industry to select and apply 
an organization design structure from almost unlimited possibilities.
The government's use of a philosophy of minimized dedicated 
organizational resources restricted the organization design possibilities
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available to those capable of being performed with such an organizational 
resources investment limitation. The government's selection of a 
functionally aligned organization design structure appears to be in 
consonance with the limitations imposed by such an organization resources 
investment philosophy. The functional alignment to three basic groupings 
(research and development, production and logistics, and site activation) 
is indicative of an attempt to focus the limited organizational resources 
on areas of major importance. The absence of an organization design 
element responsible for the macro perspective decreases the ability of 
the functional alignment to operate effectively using a philosophy of 
minimized dedicated organization resources. The use of a large number 
of staff offices further dilutes the amount of organizational resources 
available when such a philosophy is used.
Industry's use of a philosophy of maximized dedicated organizational 
resources and a product based organization design structure appear to be 
compatible. The government's use of a philosophy of minimized organi­
zational resources investment is balanced somewhat by industry's use of 
a significantly different philosophy. The limitation on use of dedicated 
organizational resources in government field management is somewhat 
off-set by industry's use of maximized dedicated organizational resources.
The macro perspective of program integration is critical in 
government field management. The multiple goals of the organization 
that result from pressures of external clientele, the use of a philosophy 
of minimized dedicated organizational resources, and the use of a 
segmenting type of functionally based organization design structure, 
when combined, demands the macro perspective of program integration
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as a reference framework. The absence of an organization design element 
responsible for the macro perspective intensities the importance of 
program integration. The absence of such an element is partially 
compensated by the situation whereby the hierarchical apex of the 
government organization design structure has assumed the operational 
macro perspective function.
The macro perspective of program integration is not as important 
in industry field management as it is in government field management. 
Industry's organization design structure is more synthesizing in 
orientation than that of government's. Although the product and service 
alignment of industry's organization design structure is micro in 
perspective, the macro perspective is maintained through use of an 
organization design element dedicated to such a perspective. The 
effectiveness of the industry macro perspective organization design 
element is somewhat diluted by its inability to interface with a com­
parable government field management element at less than the level of 
the Commanding General.
Both the government and industry organization designs diverge 
from the general applicability proposition that when program integration 
is important a dedicated organization design element is necessary to 
develop and retain the macro perspective. The divergence from this 
proposition appears to be the result of diametrically opposed situations. 
In government field management, program integration is important but no 
dedicated organization design element exists. In industry field manage­
ment, program integration is less important than in government but a 
dedicated organization design element exists. The existence of a
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dedicated organization design element for the macro perspective in 
industry's structure apparently is not detrimental to the interrelation­
ship balance of organization design and program integration. Its 
absence in the organization design structure of government field manage­
ment seems to be detrimental. The detrimental effect in government field 
management is partially alleviated by the existence of the dedicated 
element in industry's organization design structure and by the hierarchical 
apex of the government organization design structure assuming an opera­
tional role in relation to the macro perspective.
The general applicability proposition relating to performance 
measurement functioning as the operational contro^ system is recognized 
by both the government and industry field management organizations.
Although recognized, the proposition is implemented only in a sterile 
sense in both organizations. Government field management is faced 
with having to respond to numerous situations of externally imposed 
performance measurement schemes. The benefits of these performance 
measurement schemes must be assessed in relation to higher levels of 
government than that of Safeguard program field management. To program 
field management they provide little, if any, benefit. The combination 
of having to respond to many externally imposed performance measurement 
schemes and the use of a philosophy of minimization of dedicated organi­
zational resources dilutes the government field management capability.
This situation denies the use of performance measurement as the 
operational control system and, thus, denies program integration one 
of its basic elements.
In its role of operational control system, performance measurement 
is reflected as a mixed condition in industry field management.
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Performance measurement, in the sense of industry's role of supplier, 
does not function as the operational control system. It is mechanistic 
and sterile in nature. Industry's efforts in relation to internal 
company needs does function as the operational control system. Use of 
this system and its results are not accessable to the relationship 
between industry and government field management nor to the composite field 
management effort.
Recognition of the basic elements of program integration appear to 
exist in both government and industry field management. Although recog­
nized, optimizing of the elements is not necessarily emphasized. With 
program integration important in government field management, optimizing 
of its basic elements is necessary. With program integration being of less 
importance to industry than it is to government, optimizing of its basic 
elements is not as mandatory as it is in government field management.
The need for retaining comparable levels of emphasis is not emphasized 
by either government or industry field management. Industry's ability 
to emphasize program integration, when program integration is less than 
critical to its scheme of management, is one such illustration. Govern­
ment's inability to emphasize program integration, when program integration 
is critical to its scheme of management, also illustrates the absence 
of emphasis on the need for comparable levels of emphasis.
The general applicability proposition that interdependent organiza­
tion design structures require mutual compatibility of perspectives is not 
emphasized in field management of the Safeguard program. Program 
integration is critical to the government, but not as much so to industry. 
Industry's organization design structure has the ability to emphasize
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program integration, the government's does not. The government's 
organization design structure has no dedicated element for the macro 
perspective, Industry's does. Industry's organization design structure 
Is based on product, that of the government on function. Each of these 
conflicting situations Illustrates the Incompatibility of perspectives 
between the government and Industry field management organizations.
Safeguard Implementation 
To suggest Implementing actions necessary to balance organization 
design and program Integration In field management of the Safeguard 
program. It Is necessary to establish certain "groundrules" that must 
be followed In the development of such Implementing actions. These 
"groundrules" are;
1. Situations Illustrated by the preceding discussion of 
Safeguard program peculiarities provide the bases for suggesting 
Implementing actions necessary to achieve balance between organization 
design and program Integration.
2. The propositions of general applicability provide the 
framework within which the Implementation suggestions are formulated.
3. Maximum use Is made of Implementation suggestions that 
encompass correction of more than one Indication of Imbalance.
Using the above "groundrules," the following Implementation actions 
are suggested as those minimally necessary to achieve organization 
design and program Integration balance In government field management:
1. Establish a government organization design element 
dedicated to the development and retention of the macro perspective.
This would provide the synthesizing Influence necessary to emphasize
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program integration. It would alleviate the imbalance between an 
organization design structure both segmenting in orientation and 
requiring program integration emphasis and the present inability of 
the organization design structure to emphasize program integration.
Such an element should enhance the ability of the presently existing 
macro perspective element in the industry organization design structure 
by providing that element a comparable interface point. The perspectives 
of the interdependent field management organizations should become 
more compatible.
2. Use program integration as the reference framework for 
output efficiency measurement and comparison. This would allow the 
pressures of the multiple clientele of government field management to 
be assessed in relation to the basic goal of program accomplishment and 
not as separate entities in themselves.
3. Relax the emphasis on formality and proceduralization in 
all aspects of the program. This would require relaxation of the formal 
rank and grade structure, less emphasis on the formal planning process, 
and less control and proceduralization in the formal communications 
system. This should result in increased emphasis on the operational 
planning process as a basic element of program integration, less use
of the informal communications system and its resultant conflict with the 
formal organization design structure, and a more comprehensive program 
perspective for members of the organization.
4. Reorient performance measurement efforts toward satis­
faction of operational control system needs. Performance measurement 
aligned to satisfaction of such needs would enable field management
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program status to be evaluated in relation to the operational program 
environment and not in relation to sterotyped criteria now used. Externally 
imposed performance measurement schemes would have to be satisfied as 
by-products of operational needs.
The following implementation actions are suggested as those 
minimally necessary to achieve balance between organization design and 
program integration in industry field management;
1. Relax the stringent control on communications between the 
industry and government field management organizations. This would 
allow information presently available in industry field management to be 
made available to the composite effort. Due to the formalization involved 
in contractual arrangements, the contract documents do not suffice as the 
sole mechanism for government use in obtaining information from industry.
2. Elevate program accomplishment to major importance as an 
industry goal. This would require deemphasis of the present industry 
goal of retention of its perception of its public image. Increasing the 
importance of program accomplishment as an industry basic goal should 
support the basic goal of government field management and make the goals 
priority of the two organizations more compatible. Less emphasis on the 
goal of retention of the company's perception of its public image would 
require company recognition that the Safeguard program is a defense weapon 
programs and by chosing to serve as the prime contractor the company assumes 
the public image of a defense contractor.
3. Recognize the custoraer-supplier relation in field manage­
ment of the Safeguard program. Industry, as supplier, must provide 
whatever services and efforts that are desired by government, as customer.
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Recognition of the supplier dependency should support program integration 
needs by reducing the formality emphasis now used by industry.
4. Use the same performance measurement system for inter­
relationship with government field management as that used for intra­
company needs. The present performance measurement system used in relation 
to government is based on formal contract requirements. Such performance 
measurement is sterile in relation to the composite program. Measurement 
of performance from the standpoint of relations with government field 
management and of intra-company needs should be the same. Dual systems 
in industry field management decreases the ability of performance measure­
ment to function as the operational control system for the composite 
program.
Although the suggested implementations can be viewed as "oughts," 
their relevance to the subject of organization design and proggram inte­
gration interrelationship in field management of the Safeguard program 
are apparent. They represent the ultimate step in the analysis of an 
applied subject. Analysis of a practical subject should identify the 
sensitive aspects involved, establish the theoretical framework that is 
applicable, determine the results of the particular study, project the 
results of the particular study to the level of general applicability, 
and derive a corrective benefit for the particular subject of the study.
The suggested implementation actions provide a corrective benefit for 
field management of the Safeguard program.
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